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Clark: Cell Phones as Tracking Devices

CELL PHONES AS TRACKING DEVICES
M. Wesley Clark*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the ubiquitous cell phone, law enforcement has
been handed a priceless investigative tool without the outlay of any
Federal funds for the hardware. Prior to the rapid rise in cell phone use,
the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), for example, would use
traditional tracking equipment1 that it owned (or borrowed) and would
have to surreptitiously install it, typically on or in a vehicle, aircraft, or
boat or secreted in containers carrying precursor chemicals needed to
manufacture controlled substances.
The great advantages of cell phone tracking are (1) that many if not
most adults have at least one cell phone (thus permitting the tracking of
countless individuals as opposed to following only the travels of a much
more limited class of conveyances2 and drums of chemicals); and (2) law
enforcement is spared the legal and tactical hurdles that are often
encountered when seeking to install the tracking devices.

Mr. Clark is a Senior Attorney with the Office of Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement
Administration, and an adjunct professor at George Mason University, teaching
“Surveillance and Privacy in Contemporary Society.” The views expressed herein are his
and do not reflect the views of the DEA Office of Chief Counsel, DEA, or the Department of
Justice. This Article is an expansion of one appearing in the May 2006 FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, titled Cell Phone Technology and Physical Surveillance.
1
Even government-owned tracking devices are undergoing modernization in the 21st
century, moving from radio tracking devices to those utilizing the more precise satellite
global positioning system (“GPS”). GPS tracking by law enforcement has been upheld on
the same basis as the older, more traditional, radio-based tracking equipment. See United
States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467-68 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). For a further discussion of
GPS tracking, see infra note 330 and accompanying text. Note, however, that today “the
traditional homing devices . . . are now monitored via radio signals using the same cell
phone towers used to transmit cell site data.” In re the Application of the U.S.A. for an
Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification
System on Telephone Numbers [sealed] and [sealed] and the Production of Real Time Cell
Site Information, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (D. Md. 2005) [hereafter DMD#1].
2
If the suspect leaves or changes the conveyance to which a tracking device has been
affixed, law enforcement has lost the ability to electronically determine the surveillance
target’s location. Assuming the suspect has not passed off the cell phone to someone else,
this is not the case with cell phone tracking. Cell phone service providers whose
instruments do not contain GPS chips were directed by the FCC to “be able to pinpoint 67
percent of calls within 100 meters and 95 percent of calls within 300 meters.” DMD#1, 402
F. Supp. 2d at 599 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 2018(h)(1)(2005)).
*
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Case law was supposedly well-settled after two Supreme Court cases
decided in the 1980s, United States v. Knotts3 and United States v. Karo.4
These cases held that so long as the conveyance or “thing” to be
monitored is out and about on “public thoroughfares,”5 “open fields,” or
even on private property6—all instances where the information revealed
by the surveillance target could be observed by visual surveillance
engaged in by third parties─no showing of any evidence, let alone
probable cause, is required.7 This, of course, does not present a problem,
so long as the tracking equipment belongs to the government, but it does
present a very real issue when third-party assistance is necessary to
conduct the monitoring.
The rub is that cell phone companies, concerned about potential
liability, will not furnish cell phone location information to law
enforcement absent a court order. The legal issue of the moment relates
to the proper quantum of evidence that the government must
demonstrate to a court before such an order for prospective (or real-time)8
data will be given.

460 U.S. 276 (1983).
468 U.S. 705 (1984).
5
“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another . . . . [The subject]
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over
particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of
his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.” Knotts, 460
U.S. at 281-82.
6
“[N]otions of physical trespass based on the law of real property [are] not
dispositive . . . .” Id. at 285.
7
Probable cause to monitor will be required if electronic tracking is to occur within a
private dwelling, i.e., a “location not open to visual surveillance,” or—assuming it too is
not open to visual surveillance—its curtilage. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-15. (A thorough
discussion of “curtilage” is outside the scope of this Article.)
8
It is submitted that for other than stored, previously-acquired cell site location data,
“real-time” and “prospective cell site information” are conceptually the same thing:
permission is being sought to obtain “yet-to-be” information that is to be acquired/become
available during a span of time that is to occur after an authorizing court order would be
signed. However, one court has suggested that the two terms can mean different things:
Real time cell site information is a subset of “prospective” cell site
information, which refers to all cell site information that is generated
after the government has received court permission to acquire it.
Records stored by the wireless provider that detail the location of a cell
phone in the past (i.e.: prior to entry of the court order authorizing
government acquisition) are known as “historical” cell site
information.
DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005).
3
4
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In a 2004 cell phone tracking case, United States v. Forest,9 DEA
already had authority to intercept wire communications pursuant to
Title III10 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522). Additionally, the Title III order
directed the provider “to disclose to the government all subscriber
information, toll records, and other information relevant to the
government’s investigation.”11 As an aid to the establishment of visual
contact with the subject, DEA dialed the target’s cell phone (without
letting it ring) several times in the course of the day and would then
obtain the cell phone location information from the service provider.12
Among other things, the defendant argued that in so doing, DEA
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Of course the threshold question
was whether or not securing the cell site location information constituted
either a search or a seizure. For that to be the case, there must have first
been a “subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable”; but that was not the situation in Forest because the data
“was used to track [the target’s] movements only on public highways.”13
The Sixth Circuit thus concluded that Knotts was controlling and that
there was “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell-site data
because the DEA agents could have obtained the same information by
following [the target’s] car.”14
But in most location surveillance scenarios, law enforcement will
probably not be fortunate enough to have a Title III order up and
running, like in Forest, thus presenting the need for a stand-alone order.
To obtain such court authorization, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
has been using selected provisions from Title II of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”),15 primarily 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d),
355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 856 (2004).
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82
Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)).
11
Forest, 355 F.3d at 947.
12
DEA used the carrier’s “computer data to determine which cellular transmission
towers were being ‘hit’ by [the target’s] phone. This ‘cell-site data’ revealed the general
location of [the target].” Id.
13
Id. at 950-51.
14
Id. at 951. “Although the DEA agents were not able to maintain visual contact with
[the target’s] car at all times, visual observation was possible by any member of the public.
The DEA simply used the cell-site data to ‘augment[ ] the sensory faculties bestowed upon
them at birth,’ which is permissible under Knotts . . . . [T]he cell site data is simply a proxy
for [the target’s] visually observable location.” Id.
15
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (2000). Note that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (Title
II of the ECPA, as amended) is sometimes informally referred to as the Stored
Communications Act or SCA, even though it is not denominated as such within the body
of the ECPA.
9

10
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either alone or in combination with the pen register/trap and trace
statute (“Pen/Trap Statute”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.16
This has not proved to be a winning strategy, however, and DOJ is
(depending upon how one keeps score and as of this writing) 0-17-5 or 517 in a series of late 2005-early 2007 federal cases before twelve United
States Magistrate Judges (“USMJs”) and five District Court Judges in
twelve different judicial districts (California; two in Indiana; Louisiana;
Maryland; three in New York; Texas; Washington, D.C.; Wisconsin; and
West Virginia).17 In the course of their decisions, most of the courts
16
Prior to passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 212 (2001), “pen register” was defined as a “device which records or
decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise
transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached[.]” Before the advent of
cell phones (at a time when telephones were connected by copper wires), a pen register was
actually a machine that printed onto a roll of paper all number dialed from the targeted
phone. It would also print the times that the telephone receiver was picked up (“off hook”)
and when it was replaced (“on hook”). See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979).
Today most of the data that the machines used to acquire and print out are collected and
arranged by service provider computer feeds and software. “[I]nformation that was
heretofore captured by a pen register can now be transmitted digitally by the telephone
service provider.” In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order for Disclosure of
Telecommunications Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and
Trace Device, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter SDNY#1]. In
recognition of this technology shift, § 216 of the USA PATRIOT Act updated the pen
register definition (and, relatedly, that of the trap and trace “device” as well) so that
§ 3127(3) now describes a pen register as “a device or process which records or decodes
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or
facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted[.]” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3127(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2005).
17
In addition to DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005), and SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp.
2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), these are: In re an Application of U.S.A. for an Order (1)
Authorizing the use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing
Release of Subscriber Information and/or Cell Site Information, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter EDNY #1], on reconsideration, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 [hereinafter
EDNY #2]; In re the Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter SDTX#1]; In re the
Applications of U.S.A. for Orders Authorizing the Disclosure of Cell Cite Information, Nos.
05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05-411, 2005 WL 3658531 (D.D.C. Oct. 26,
2005) [hereinafter DDC#1]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the
Release of Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2005) [hereinafter
DDC#2]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Release of
Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2006) [hereinafter DDC#3];
In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell
Site Information, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006) [hereinafter EDWIS#1]; In re the
Application of U.S.A. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device; and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information
and/or Cell Site Information, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006) [hereinafter WDLA]; In re
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concluded that an order based upon probable cause and grounded upon
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (“Rule 41”) is required to compel
cell phone providers to divulge real-time/prospective cell site location
information.18

the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen
Register and/or Trap and Trace for Mobile Identification Number (585) 111-1111 and the
Disclosure of Subscriber and Activity Information Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, 415 F. Supp. 2d
211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter WDNY]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register with Caller Identification Device and
Cell Site Location Authority on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663 (S.D. W.
Va. 2006) [hereinafter SDWVA]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for Orders Authorizing the
Installation and Use of Pen Registers and Caller Identification Devices on Telephone
Numbers [Sealed] and [Sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006) [hereinafter DMD#2]; In
re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Information on
a Certain Cellular Telephone, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 468300 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,
2006) [hereinafter SDNY#2]; In re the Application for an Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register Device, Trap and Trace Device, Dialed Number Interceptor,
Number Search Device, and Caller Identification Service, and the Disclosure of Billing,
Subscriber, and Air Time Information, No.S-06-SW-0041 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2006)
[hereinafter EDCA]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing
Release of Subscriber and Other Information, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
[hereinafter SDTX#2]; United States v. Bermudez, No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181
(S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006) [hereinafter SDIND]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order:
(1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Information; and (3) Authorizing the
Disclosure of Location-Based Services; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order: (1)
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2)
Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Information; and (3) Location of Cell Site
Origination and/or Termination, Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 1876847 (N.D. Ind.
July 5, 2006) [hereinafter NDIND]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing
(1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access
to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
[hereinafter SDTX#3]; In re the Application for an Order Authorizing the Installation and
Use of a Pen Register and Directing the Disclosure of Telecommunications Records for the
Cellular Phone Assigned the Number [SEALED], 439 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Md. 2006)
[hereinafter DMD#3]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order Authorizing the
Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information, No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743 (E.D.
Wis. Oct. 6, 2006) [hereinafter EDWIS#2]; In re the Application of U.S.A. for an Order for
Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d
448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter SDNY#3]; In re Application for an Order Authorizing the
Extension and Use of a Pen Register Device, No. 07-SW-034 GGH, 2007 WL 397129 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter EDCA#2].
18
This is not to conclude that legal underpinnings other than 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703 and
§§ 3121-3127 or FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 are not available upon which to ground an application
for an order compelling a cell phone service provider to provide real-time/prospective cell
site location information. See discussion infra note 99; infra Part III.A (Alternative Legal
Foundation).
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II. BACKGROUND AND CASES
A. Eastern District of
(EDNY#1/EDNY#2)

New

York—August

and

October,

2005

Underpinning its application with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(B), (c)(2),
and (d), the U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) sought an order compelling
the “disclosure of the location of cell site/sector (physical address) at call
origination (for outbound calling), call termination (for incoming calls),
and if reasonably available, during the progress of a call, for the Subject
Telephone.”19 Of these three subsections,20 the USMJ found that only
one, § 2703(d), might provide a basis for the order sought. An order
pursuant to that provision can be had upon a showing of “specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”21
The USMJ concluded that the government had provided the
requisite level of evidence called for by § 2703(d) and that under the
statutory definition,22 cell site location information would, in fact,
constitute the “contents of . . . [an] electronic communication” except for
one thing: the definition of “electronic communication”23 specifically
excludes “any communication from a tracking device,”24 the latter term
being defined at 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) as “an electronic or mechanical
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or
EDNY#1, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) provides that the government may require “[a] provider of
electronic communication service or remote computing service [to] disclose a record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service . . . [when the
Government obtains a court order pursuant to § 2703(d)].” An “electronic communication
service,” the term relevant for our purposes, is “any service which provides to users thereof
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications[.]” Id. § 2510(15). Cell
phone calls are a type of “wire communication.” Section 2703(c)(2) provides that electronic
communications services and remote computing services “shall disclose to a governmental
entity the—(A) name; (B) address; (C) local and long distance telephone connection
records, or records of session times and durations; (D) length of service (including start
date) and types of service utilized; (E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber
number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and (F) means
and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account
number)” if the government obtains, inter alia, an order pursuant to § 2703(d).
21
Id. § 2703(d).
22
See id. § 2510(12) (defining electronic communication by operation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2711(1)).
23
Id.
24
Id. § 2510(12)(C).
19
20
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object.” The USMJ determined that based upon the statutory definitions,
the targeted cell phone equated to—and was thus “precisely describe[d]”
as—a tracking device. Thus the court felt it was constrained from
granting the government’s application for a tracking order to the extent
the pleading was based upon 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
Because the government’s application also sought permission to
conduct pen register as well as trap and trace operations, the court felt
that “[i]n fairness . . . [it] must also consider whether the relief is
available simply by virtue of the government’s otherwise proper
application . . . ” for this additional authority.25 The USMJ concluded the
Pen/Trap statute did not provide such a basis because specific language
in the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(“CALEA”)26 precluded it. Among other things, CALEA mandated that
telecommunications carriers be technologically able to
expeditiously isolat[e] and enabl[e] the government,
pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization,
to access call-identifying information . . . except that,
with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to
the authority for pen registers and trap and trace
devices . . . , such call-identifying information shall not
include any information that may disclose the physical
location of the subscriber . . . .27
Distilling matters, the USMJ opined that “where a carrier’s assistance
to law enforcement is ordered on the basis of something less than
probable cause, such assistance must not include disclosure of a
subscriber’s physical location.”28 Upon reconsideration, the USMJ again
25
EDNY#1, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). It should be kept in mind that the
government never grounded its request for cell site location information upon 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121-3127. Note that after EDNY#1, but before EDNY#2, SDTX#1 was issued. The
USMJ who decided EDNY #1 and EDNY#2 “. . . considered precisely the same statutes and
legislative history as [did the SDTX#1 USMJ] (and apparently many of the same
arguments), and . . . independently arrived at the same conclusions as did he.” EDNY#2,
396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
26
Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 103, 108 Stat. 4279, 4280-81 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)(2)(B) (2000)).
27
47 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a)(2)(B).
28
EDNY#1, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 565. To the extent the government seeks a cell phone
user’s location based upon the Pen/Trap Statute, this is correct. However, and despite the
USMJ’s discussion in EDNY#2, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 325-26, a strong argument exists that
such information can be obtained from carriers based upon a less than probable cause
order issued pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) states in pertinent part that “. . . a court is empowered to issue a warrant
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denied the government’s request for real-time cell site location
information again concluding that the existing law did not allow the
government to obtain the information “on a prospective, real-time basis
without a showing of probable cause.”29
B. Southern District of Texas—October 2005 (SDTX#1)
In the Texas case, the government specifically combined a pen/trap
request with one seeking subscriber records—as the latter term is
described at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). The application also sought, in part,
the prospective/real-time “location30 of cell site/sector (physical
address) at call origination (for outbound calling), call termination (for
incoming calls), and, if reasonably available, during the progress of a
call.”31 In addition to this, however, the request also asked for more than
had been requested in the EDNY #1 application: “information regarding
the strength, angle, and timing of the caller’s signal measured at two or
more cell sites, as well as other system information such as a listing of all
cell towers in the market area, switching technology, protocols, and
network architecture.”32 As a result, the question that the USMJ found
himself faced with was whether “this location information [is] merely
another form of subscriber record accessible upon a showing of ‘specific
and articulable facts’ under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), as the government
contends[,] . . . [or whether] this type of surveillance require[s] a more
exacting standard, such as probable cause under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41[.]”33

or other order for the installation of a mobile tracking device[.]” (emphasis added). Note that
although the government invoked both the Pen/Trap Statute and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), it
“identifies no other method for its agents to obtain the information it seeks[.]” EDNY#1,
384 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
29
EDNY#2, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 295. Note that upon his reconsideration, which included
a second, perhaps closer look at the government’s proposed applications and orders, the
USMJ changed his earlier conclusion—which was that the government was asking the cell
phone carrier to surrender cell site location information—to one that construed the
government’s request to be one seeking authority to use a pen register to acquire the data
“and not through any actual disclosure from a provider of electronic communications
service[,]” but this was not significant because “Congress plainly intended the ‘location’
prohibition in CALEA to regulate not only what a carrier can provide, but also what law
enforcement can lawfully ‘obtain.’” Id. at 307 n.9.
30
At an earlier time, the court appears to have granted a government application for
historical cell site data. SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2005). For a
description of the interaction between cell phones and cell phone towers, see id. at 750.
31
Id. at 749. This is exactly the same language used in the EDNY#1 application.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 749-50.
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At the end of the day, the court in SDTX#1 came to the same
conclusion as the USMJ in EDNY#1 and EDNY#2 and rejected all of the
government’s theories—Pen/Trap, Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”),34 and the hybrid mix of the two.35 The USMJ ended his opinion
by observing that “[d]enial of the government’s request for prospective
cell site data in this instance should have no dire consequences for law
enforcement. This type of surveillance is unquestionably available upon
a traditional probable cause showing under Rule 41.”36
C. District of Maryland—November 2005 (DMD#1)
In the Maryland case, the government again raised its combined
Pen/Trap-SCA hybrid theory and suffered the same result: “[The first
two USMJs] reject[ed] this ‘hybrid theory’ under almost identical
rationales. . . . This court joins them.”37 Although the outcome for the
government was the same as in the earlier USMJ opinions, the court here
at least helpfully recognized, but to no effect, that if obtaining real time
cell site information is the same as obtaining a tracking device, then the
government is likely not “constitutionally required to obtain a warrant”
so long as the phone is in a public place and visual surveillance is
possible.38 This was because in the final analysis,
The court will not enter an order authorizing disclosure
of real time cell site information under authority other
than Rule 41, nor upon a showing of less than probable
cause. To the extent the government seeks to act
without a warrant, the government acts at its peril, as it

See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
The government’s “hybrid” theory is explained well by the court in SDTX#1, 396 F.
Supp. 2d at 761. Summarizing, this construct approach proceeds from the realization that
CALEA precluded use “solely” of the Pen/Trap Statute to obtain prospective/real-time cell
site location information, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2), thus necessitating the conjunctive use of at
least one more statute, i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), which permits acquisition of non-content
subscriber information, such as—arguably—cell site location information.
By mixing and matching statutory provisions in this manner, the
government concludes that cell site data enjoys a unique status under
electronic surveillance law—a new form of electronic surveillance
combining the advantages of the pen/trap law and the SCA (real-time
location tracking based on less than probable cause) without their
respective limitations.
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761.
36
SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
37
DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2005).
38
Id. at 604.
34
35
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may not monitor an electronic tracking device in a
private place without a warrant.39
D. District of the District of Columbia—October and December 2005; January
2006 (DDC#1/DDC#2/DDC#3)
Facing the SDTX#1 and both EDNY decisions, the government
unsuccessfully tried in DDC#1 to marry the SCA with the Pen/Trap
statute. However, this approach suffered the same fate as it had in the
earlier Texas and New York decisions. The mixture of the SCA and the
Pen/Trap statute, wrote the USMJ, “has been rejected by two courts for
reasons which . . . [this court] finds compelling. . . . [This court has]
determined that the disclosure of cell cite [sic] information is not
authorized by Section 2703, by Sections 3122 and 3123, or by any
combination of the two provisions.”40 The deciding USMJ went on to
state that two other USMJs in the district, including USMJ Facciola, the
author of DDC#2 and DDC#3, shared the same views.41
Also
recognizing the SDTX#1 and EDNY opinions, but not necessarily
conceding their “validity,” the government in DDC#2 attempted an
unholy union of the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)42 and
sought to “demonstrat[e] probable cause to believe that the requested
prospective cell cite [sic] information is relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.”43 More specifically, the USMJ in
DDC#2 found that this formulation was “tautological,” and, in the
court’s analogy, that the attempt was akin to designing a horse by a
committee and instead constructing a camel.44 The court determined
that “the probable cause showing does not meet the central problem
identified in the [SDTX#1 and EDNY] cases, that the statutes upon which
the government purports to rely in those cases and in this one, i.e., 18
Id. at 605. This, of course, is no different from the risk the government regularly and
as a matter of practice assumes when using traditional or GPS tracking devices.
40
DDC#1, Nos. 05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05-411, 2005 WL 3658531,
at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005).
41
Id. Curiously, neither the DDC#2 nor the DDC#3 opinion, each written by USMJ
Facciola, referred to DDC#1.
42
The court appears to incorrectly see this as a somewhat bizarre blending of the Fourth
Amendment with the standard articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2), the Pen/Trap Statute.
However, whereas 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), part of the SCA, mandates that applicants “offer[ ]
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the . . . records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation[,]” § 3122(b)(2) requires only that an applicant certify to the court
that pen/trap information “is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation[.]” DDC#2, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2005).
43
DDC#2, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 132-33.
44
Id. at 133.
39
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U.S.C. §§ 3122, 3123, 2703(c)(1) do not authorize the government to
secure cell site data that would disclose the location of the person using
the cell phone.”45
A month later (DDC#3), the government returned to the same USMJ
as in DDC#2 without replacing the hybrid approach, still championing
the Pen/Trap Statute in combination with the SCA. To buttress its
application, the government also submitted a supporting, self-styled
affidavit prepared by the investigating agent but, in the court’s words,
this did nothing but “put[ ] us back to where we started.”46 Referring to
and following the ultimate conclusions already reached by the USMJs in
Texas, New York, and Maryland, the court opined that “the standard
that pertains to the issuance [of an order seeking prospective cell site
location information] is, as the Fourth Amendment requires, probable
cause to believe that the information sought is itself evidence of a crime,
not that the information is relevant to an investigation.”47 Further, the
government’s proffer of “‘probable cause to show relevance to an
ongoing investigation’” is “an ersatz standard[.]”48
One of the most important matters CALEA addressed was law
enforcement’s continued access to the fast changing telecommunications
infrastructure for the purpose of conducting lawful electronic
surveillance.
With the emergence of wireless technology, law
enforcement did not want to be in a worse situation when attempting to
engage in such surveillance than it was when telephony was
accomplished only through copper wires.49 Providers were thus
required by CALEA to ensure that their deploying technologies would
permit the same electronic surveillance access as before while at the
same time ensuring continuing safeguards against unwarranted privacy
intrusions by law enforcement under 47 U.S.C. § 1002.
Passage of the legislation, which guaranteed continued access by law
enforcement—given the advent of wireless technologies—to callidentifying information via pen registers, was ensured by inserting the
Id.
DDC#3, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.D.C. 2006).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
“The purpose of . . . [CALEA] is to preserve the government’s ability, pursuant to
court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept communications involving advanced
technologies such as digital or wireless transmission modes . . . while protecting the
privacy of communications and without impeding the introduction of new technologies,
features, and services.” H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 9 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3489.
45
46
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restriction that in no event could such data “include any information that
may disclose the physical location of the subscriber[.]”50 During
consideration of the bill which became CALEA,51 the Congressional
testimony of (then) FBI Director Louis Freeh, which endorsed this
restriction, was influential in securing passage.52 The USMJ found
Director Freeh’s statement compelling:
The Director’s offer and its acceptance by Congress led
to
the
exception
codified
as
47
U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)(2) . . . [T]he exception was based on the
express representation by the government to Congress
that the authority for pen registers and trap and trace
devices would not and could not be used to secure
location information, the very information the
government now wants to secure by using a pen register
and trap and trace device.53
Not only was the USMJ unconvinced that the Pen/Trap Statute
provided a legal basis for acquiring cell site location information, he was
similarly unpersuaded that “Congress intended to permit the
government to use the Pen Register Statute to avail itself of that
technology [to ascertain the location of a person using a cell phone],
provided it combined its use . . . with some other means[,]” e.g., the SCA.
Such a conclusion, continued the USMJ, was
utterly counter-intuitive . . . . It is inconceivable to [the
USMJ] that the Congress that precluded the use of the
Pen Register statute to secure in 1994 ‘transactional
data’ . . . nevertheless
intended
to
permit
the
Id.
H.R. 4922, 103d Cong. (1994). “The FBI Director testified that the legislation was
intended to preserve the status quo, that it was intended to provide law enforcement no
more and no less access to information than it had in the past.” H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at
22, as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3502.
52
The testimony continued,
Therefore, H.R. 4922 includes provisions, which FBI Director Freeh
supported in his testimony, that add protections to the exercise of the
government’s current surveillance authority.
Specifically, the
bill: . . . expressly provides that the authority for pen registers and trap
and trace devices cannot be used to obtain tracking or location
information . . . . Currently, in some cellular systems, transactional
data that could be obtained by a pen register may include location
information.
H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 17, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3497.
53
DDC#3, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 138 (D.D.C. 2006).
50
51
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government to use that same statute, whether by itself or
combined with some other means, to secure the
infinitely more intrusive information about the location
of a cell phone every minute of every day that the cell
phone was on.54
E. Southern District of New York—December 2005 (SDNY#1)
Although the first Southern District of New York decision could be
viewed as a government victory, that success is somewhat illusory
because the location information sought here was relatively imprecise
(hence less intrusive or invasive) when compared to the more focused
data at issue in the cases already discussed. This distinction is key and
was both recognized and explored not only by the USMJ in SDNY#1 but
also later by the USMJ in DDC#3. The SDNY#1 USMJ granted the
government’s application seeking “information pertaining to the location
of cell site towers receiving a signal from a particular cellular telephone,”
i.e., “cell site activations,”55 and requesting that the cell phone company
provide a map detailing the locations of its cell towers, i.e., their
“‘locations/addresses, sectors and orientations[,]’” to include “‘the
physical address/location of all cellular towers in the specified
market.’”56 As might be expected given the differing call volumes, there
are more towers in a particular urban area than would be present in a
rural area of the same size. This means that the towers will be closer to
each other in the city than in outlying areas. As a rule, therefore, an
operating cell phone’s location can be determined with more precision
when the towers in communication with the mobile phone are closer
together.

Id. at 140. The USMJ explains that ascertaining the location of one’s cell phone (and
thus the user) is more “intrusive” than obtaining the information a pen register was
originally intended to secure—the numbers dialed from one’s phone. Id.
55
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). “Cell site activations” refers to
“‘cell-site information concerning the physical location of the antenna towers associated
with the beginning and termination of calls to and from a particular cellphone,’” i.e., but
not during the course of the call. Id. at 437 (citations omitted).
56
Id.
With respect to the beginning or end of the call (and possibly
sometimes in between), there is a listing [provided by the carrier] of a
three-digit number assigned to a cellphone tower or base station. At
least one cellular provider will give, in addition to the number of the
tower, a digit (‘1,’ ‘2’ or ‘3’) indicating a 120 degree ‘face’ of the tower
towards which the cell phone is signaling.
Id.
54

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 2

1426 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

The SDNY#1 USMJ took great pains to distinguish the less exact
types of information being sought in the case before him from those at
issue before the USMJs in the SDTX#1, EDNY, and DMD#1 cases:
First, the cell site information provided in this District is
tied only to telephone calls actually made or received by
the telephone user. Thus, no data is provided as to the
location of the cell phone when no call is in progress.
Second, at any given moment, data is provided only as
to a single cell tower with which the cell phone is
communicating. Thus, no data is provided that could be
‘triangulated’ to permit the precise location of the cell
phone user. Third, the data is not obtained by the
Government directly [from the user’s phone] but is
instead transmitted from the provider digitally to a
computer maintained by the Government.57
The government again relied upon the Pen/Trap Statute and 18
U.S.C. § 2703. Echoing observations announced in the earlier cell phone
tracking decisions, the court said that “the Pen Register Statute would by
itself provide authority for the order being sought by the Government
were it not for [47 U.S.C. § 1002].”58 Not conceding that all was thereby
necessarily lost, the court seized upon that portion of 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)(2) which provides that subscriber physical location information
may not be acquired “‘solely’ pursuant” to the Pen/Trap Statute.
Referring to a dictionary for guidance, the USMJ reasoned that “[i]f we
are told that an act is not done ‘solely’ pursuant to some authority, it can
only mean that the act is done pursuant to that authority
‘with . . . another’ authority . . . albeit in some unspecified way . . . to
authorize disclosure of cell site information.”59
The upshot of all of this is that there is “‘simply impose[d] upon law
enforcement an authorization requirement different from that minimally
necessary for use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.’”60
Although attempting to determine what, exactly, constitutes an

Id. at 438 (explanation provided). The government computer uses software to render
meaningful the raw data pushed to it by the service provider. Id. This distinction drawn
by the USMJ with regard to the degree of precision or quality of sought-after cell phone
location information strikes one as being akin to the old saw about “being a little bit
pregnant.”
58
Id. at 440.
59
Id. at 442 (internal citations omitted).
60
Id. at 443 (internal citations omitted).
57
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appropriate “unspecified way” is “certainly an unattractive choice,”61 the
court admitted, it nevertheless began an examination of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(c)—as urged by the government—in an effort to see whether that
provision would qualify. Recall that 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) states an order
pursuant to § 2703(c) may be had upon a government demonstration of
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.” 62 We know from § 2703(c) that a “record or
other information” is that which “pertain[s] to a subscriber to or
customer of” the communication service. Analyzing the nature of cell
phone location information, the USMJ concluded that “cell site or
tracking information comes within section 2703(c) and consequently is
the sort of ‘information’ that the Government may seek pursuant to an
order under section 2703(d).”63
In a friend of the court brief filed in the case, the Federal Defenders
of New York, Inc., argued that such a § 2703(d) order could not properly
issue because the statutory definition of “electronic communication”
specifically excludes “any communication from a tracking device.”64
This is the same argument which the EDNY USMJ found sufficiently
compelling to be determinative.65 But the SDNY#1 USMJ deflected that
contention first by recognizing that a cell phone user is a consumer of
“electronic communication service”; and, second, by acknowledging that
such service includes a number of capabilities, i.e., a package that is more
than just cell site information (hence, “electronic communication service”
cannot be the equivalent of cell phone location information). “Inasmuch
as a service that provides cellular telephone capabilities is within section

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
63
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
64
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) defines “electronic communication” as
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that
affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include . . . any
communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of
this title).
Observe that 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) incorporates the definitions set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 for
purposes of §§ 2701-2712.
65
See supra Part II.A (discussing EDNY#1 and EDNY#2).
61
62
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2510(15),66 information pertaining to a subscriber of that ‘service’ is
obtainable under section 2703(c).”67
In other words, information on the location of cell
towers is not the ‘service’ to which a cellular customer
subscribes. Instead, the user subscribes to the voice—
and perhaps data-transmission capabilities provided by
the cellular carrier.
Although tower location
information may be a necessary ingredient for the
operation of that service, the ‘service’ to which the user
subscribes is still the ‘electronic communication’
capabilities of the cellular telephone . . . . The exception
in section 2510(12)(C) [“communication from a tracking
device”] does not purport to limit the meaning of the
term ‘information.’68
The next stumbling block to confront the USMJ was whether § 2703
could be used as a basis for acquiring information created in the future.
The New York Federal Defenders and the earlier USMJs
“question[ed] . . . whether cell site information not yet in existence at the
time of the order—that is, prospective or what is colloquially referred to
as ‘real time’ data—may be included . . . .”69 Indeed, chapter 121 of U.S.
Code Title 18, of which § 2703 is a part, is captioned “Stored Wire and
Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access,”70 thus
suggesting that its provisions relate to already acquired or historical
data. The USMJ put aside this concern for the moment, remarking in
part that—at least in his district—cell site location information “is
transmitted to the government only after it has come into the possession
of the cellular telephone provider in the form of a record.”71

66
18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) defines “electronic communication service” to be “any service
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications.”
67
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
68
Id. (citations omitted). Appreciating the mental gymnastics involved in its argument,
the court conceded that “[i]t may seem anomalous that the Government may obtain under
section 2703 a particular category of information pertaining to a user of electronic
communications that is excepted from the term electronic communications itself.” Id.
69
Id.
70
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000) (emphasis added).
71
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 447. This remark at least suggests the possibility that in
districts elsewhere, cell phone location information can be provided simultaneously to both
the provider and law enforcement. For a relatively recent state opinion permitting the
acquisition of historical cell site location information, see People v. Hall, 823 N.Y.S.2d 334
(Sup. Ct. 2006). The court determined that a cell phone could be considered to be a
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However, some of the other USMJs and the New York Federal
Defenders argued that even this being so, the government was not
entitled to a “continuing order for the cell phone company to provide
stored records in the future.”72 Indeed, whereas two statutes permitting
electronic surveillance (“ELSUR”) to occur for a period of time
subsequent to the execution of an authorizing order by a judicial officer,
Title III and the Pen/Trap Statute, both contain time limits beyond which
such surveillance cannot continue.73 Section 2703 does not, thus strongly
suggesting that it cannot rationally be viewed as a valid legal basis for
“real time” ELSUR in the form of cell phone tracking. An exercise in
comparing and contrasting is useful, conceded the USMJ, but only “as an
effort to determine whether Congress ‘intended’ section 2703 to cover
prospective cell site data.”74 Such intent is of no import, continued the
court, because the “heart of the statute-granting authority [of § 2703] to
obtain ‘information’ about cell phone customers—does not on its face
contain any limitation regarding when such information may come into
being.”75 In any event, the USMJ said, the government could get around
this issue by submitting a request to the cell phone provider every hour
(or more often) for “historical” records. “Thus, as a theoretical matter,
the statute permits the Government to obtain cell site data on a
continuing or ongoing basis even under a narrow reading of section
2703.”76
Combining the Pen/Trap Statute with § 2703 makes eminent sense,
the USMJ opined, because such a construct will contain the ELSUR time
limitation that § 2703, by itself, lacks and because such a hybrid will
avoid the difficulty foreseen—assuming just for the moment that the
Pen/Trap Statute could be used alone—that it provides but a minimal
proof standard (a mere certification of “relevance”)77 whereas § 2703
requires a higher evidentiary threshold, that of “specific and articulable
facts” showing “reasonable grounds” exist to demonstrate that the

“portion of a tracking device” only if the phone were on and it were “pinged” by the
service provider. Id. at 338.
72
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
73
Although extensions are permitted for cause shown, an initial court-ordered Title III
has a duration of 30 days, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), and pens/traps can initially extend for up to
60 days, 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (c).
74
SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).
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requested information will prove “relevant and material” to the
government’s investigation.78
A stricter Fourth Amendment standard is not required, reasoned the
court, because in the facts before it, the degree of location information
sought was not pinpoint accuracy and thus was insufficiently precise to
determine a person’s situs inside a building. “These towers can be up to
10 or more miles apart in rural areas and may be up to a half-mile or
more apart in urban areas. Moreover, the data is provided only in the
event the user happens to make or receive a telephone call.”79
Additionally, the cell phone customer, by use of the cell phone, of
necessity communicates information to a third party—the carrier. The
Supreme Court has already instructed that such communication to a
third party removes any possible privacy interest from the Fourth
Amendment’s ambit.80
By way of conclusion, the USMJ observed that because technology is
changing rapidly, any cell site information order that it may issue in the
future will set out with particularity what data that cell phone service
companies may provide (and no other). This will be:
(1) information regarding cell site location that consists
of the tower receiving transmissions from the target
phone (and any information on what portion of that
tower is receiving a transmission, if available); (2) tower
information that is tied to a particular telephone call
made or received by the user; and (3) information that is
transmitted from the provider to the government.81
F. Eastern District of Wisconsin—January 2006 (EDWIS)
In the Eastern District of Wisconsin case, based upon both the
Pen/Trap Statute and 18 U.S.C. § 2703, the hybrid theory, the
government sought an order directing the carrier to provide for a 60-day
period subsequent to the date of any order:
a. Originating and terminating cellular tower and
sector information for all calls to and from [the target]
cellular telephone (i.e., cell site activations);
78
79
80
81
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Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)).
Id. at 450.
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b. Map of cellular tower locations/addresses, sectors
and orientations; and
c. The physical address/location of all cellular towers
in the applicable markets.82
Aware of the SDTX#1, EDNY, DMD#1, DDC#3, and SDNY#1
decisions, the USMJ—troubled by the government’s request for
prospective (as opposed to historical) information—denied the
application. The court did concede that the information here requested
by the government was less invasive than that sought in SDTX#1 and
EDNY and, in fact, it was on par with that desired in SDNY#1.
However, at the end of the day the USMJ could find no lasting virtue in
the hybrid theory. Although it independently conducted its own legal
analysis, the USMJ ultimately parted ways with the SDNY#1 decision
and found the DDC#3 analysis to be the more compelling.
But the USMJ agreed with the SDNY#1 USMJ to the extent the latter
concluded that “cell site data, i.e., information on the location of cell site
towers used by a cellular telephone, is included in the term ‘signaling
information’ for purposes of the Pen/Trap Statute.”83 However, the
CALEA caveat at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) that “information acquired solely
pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace
devices . . . [i.e.,] call identifying information[,] shall not include any
information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber . . . .” proved insurmountable and could not be overcome by
trying to marry § 2703 with the Pen/Trap Statute.84 As a result, the
USMJ departed from the SDNY#1 opinion at that point.85
Just as the DDC#3 USMJ did, the EDWIS court found the CALEA
congressional testimony of FBI Director Freeh to be most telling and
indicative of congressional intent:86
. . . what is abundantly clear from . . . Director Freeh’s
testimony is that the language which found its way into
the law was predicated on the Director’s assertion to
Congress that, in the government’s view, pen register
and trap and trace devices were not to be, and would

82
83
84
85
86

EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 948-49 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
Id. at 953.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 955.
See, e.g., id. at 955-56.
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not be, used to secure location information for the
cellular phone user.87
Even though the information sought here by the government was less
comprehensive than that at issue in the DDC#3 opinion, the EDWIS
USMJ was unpersuaded that this was a meaningful distinction.
[T]he government is only seeking the location(s) of the
cell towers being used by the cell phone at the
commencement and termination of calls. But, even such
less precise location information was included in the
‘tracking information’ about which Congress was
concerned and to which Director Freeh’s mollifying
remarks were directed.88
Finally, the court opined that § 2703 could not be used to bootstrap
the Pen/Trap Statute. The USMJ remarked that “Director Freeh assured
Congress that the legislation about which he was testifying and urging
Congress to pass had nothing to do with, and did not relate to, the SCA,
to wit, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq.”89 Unfortunately for the government, the
87

Id. at 956. One segment from Director Freeh’s testimony quoted by the USMJ allowed

that
[s]ome cellular carriers do acquire information relating to the general
location of a cellular telephone for call distribution analysis purposes.
However, this information is not the specific type of information
obtained from ‘true’ tracking devices, which can require a warrant or
court order when used to track within a private location not open to
public view.
Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added). The emphasized language is key and its
significance appears to have been overlooked by the USMJs who have focused upon it but
generally. Taken together, Knotts and Karo, see infra text accompanying notes 230-44, teach
that a tracking order predicated upon the Fourth Amendment is required only when
information regarding what transpires within a residence (or curtilage not open to public
view) is to be obtained—if, in fact, such discriminating tracking is even possible. As Knotts
and Karo demonstrate, most subjects being tracked by law enforcement are out and about
where they could be observed by the public and law enforcement. But do the Fourth
Amendment, Rule 41, the SCA, or the Pen/Trap Statute even apply (or are they needed) in
such situations? Prior to ECPA’s enactment (and of the Pen/Trap Statute within it), the
DOJ would obtain pen register orders based upon Rule 57(b) and the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651. Much like one’s whereabouts on the public thoroughfares, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the digits one dials from one’s phone
which one thus conveys to a third party. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979); United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); In re the Application of U.S.A. for
an Order Directing X to Provide Access to Videotapes, No. 03-89, 2003 WL 22053105 (D.
Md. Aug. 22, 2003); United States v. Mosko, 654 F. Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1987).
88
EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
89
Id. at 958.
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USMJ found its hybrid theory to be “much more a legislative collage
than a legislative mosaic.”90
G. Western District of Louisiana—January 2006 (WDLA)
Because the government in WDLA sought only the same kinds and
degrees of information at issue in SDNY#1, the substance and rationale
of that decision were embraced by the WDLA USMJ. Specifically, the
SDNY#1 order
did not authorize[ ] any cell site information that might
be available when the user’s cell phone was turned ‘on’
but a call was not in progress. . . . [As a result, the
WDLA USMJ] adopt[ed] [the SDNY#1 USMJ’s] detailed
analysis and will allow the Government to obtain the
same information subject to the same limitations.91
Also noteworthy was that unlike the situation presented with a “true
‘tracking device’”—which cannot be disabled or turned off by the
target—the court observed that a cell phone user can prevent anyone
from obtaining the tracking information the instrument is generating by
either powering off the phone or simply by not making any calls.92
Further, said the court, “[u]nlike true tracking devices, locations within
buildings cannot be determined by the information authorized by this
ruling.”93 In any event, because the location information actually being
sought by the government in the case before him was relatively inexact
(it will “not permit detailed tracking of a cell phone user within any
residence or building”) such that “[t]he Government will know only that
the user has made or received a call on his cell phone, and that his cell
phone communicated with a particular tower or towers during the
call[,] . . . no Fourth Amendment concerns are implicated.”94

90
Id. “If Congress intended to allow prospective cell site information to be obtained by
means of the combined authority of the SCA and the Pen/Trap Statute, such intent is not at
all apparent from the statutes themselves.” Id.
91
WDLA, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (W.D. La. 2006) (emphasis added). The USMJ
parenthetically remarked that the phones of some cell service providers, such as Nextel, are
GPS-enabled which allows Nextel “to determine its users’ locations anytime the cell phone
is turned on.” Id. at 681. Such authority was not sought here.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 682. It is questionable whether so-called “true” tracking devices can, from the
outside, ascertain where in a building the transmitting device is situated.
94
Id.
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H. Western District of New York—February 2006 (WDNY)
Trying to build upon the SDNY#1 and WDLA decisions, the
government tried its hybrid or “convergence” theory yet again, this time
in the Western District of New York, where it sought a court order from
a USMJ for relatively imprecise cell phone location information. It asked
for “cell site tower location information . . . at the inception and
termination of a call made and received by an identified cellular
telephone.”95 Such, the DOJ argued, would only provide the “general
vicinity” and not a specific location for a phone.96 The USMJ, well aware
of all of the preceding USMJ decisions discussed above, ultimately fell in
line with the majority.
First, however, the USMJ acknowledged those portions of DOJ’s
hybrid/convergence argument that he found correct: (1) “signaling
information,” which—post USA PATRIOT Act97—an authorized pen
register may obtain, includes “cell site location data”; (2) a pen register is
permitted to “capture[ ]” such data upon the government’s certification
that the “information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation”; (3) the SCA enables the government to secure
historical cell site data upon a demonstration of “reasonable grounds to
believe” that the information to be obtained is “relevant and material to
an ongoing criminal investigation”; but that (4) CALEA prohibits the
government from getting the very information it seeks pursuant to the
Pen/Trap Statute’s “likely to be relevant standard[.]”98
Then the USMJ turned to the shortcomings in DOJ’s argument,
finding the “government’s ‘convergence’ argument unconvincing[,]” and
found nothing in the express language of the Pen/Trap Statute, CALEA,
or the ECPA that indicates judges should follow a theory converging the
statutes.99 That Congress even envisioned such a unorthodox, tortured

95
WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). Assisting the court in its
understanding of the technology involved was a letter appended to the government’s
pleadings from the “Court Order Compliance Manager” of cell phone provider Verizon.
Id. at 213 n.3. The degree of cell phone location information here being sought by DOJ
would not make it possible to “pinpoint the exact location of the mobile phone” because, in
part, Verizon’s “ability to provide a cell phone’s location ‘can range from several hundred
meters to several miles.’” Id.
96
Id. at 212.
97
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
98
WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 214 (internal citations omitted).
99
Id. Continuing, the USMJ added,
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matrimony of three disparate laws, the USMJ felt, was beyond the pale.
He shared the concerns expressed by the majority of the Magistrate
Judges—who had already considered the issue now before him “as to the
wisdom and logic of predicating Congress’s intent to combine statutory
provisions separately enacted over a fifteen year period to create a new
and independent hybrid authorization mechanism on the use of the
word ‘solely’ in the [CALEA] exception clause.”100
Additionally, that the government had here limited its request to
generalized (as opposed to equally available precise) cell phone location
information was of no import.
[T]here is nothing in the legislative history of CALEA to
suggest that the exception clause was intended by
Congress to create some sort of sliding scale pairing
mechanism, with the evidentiary standard for ordering
disclosure hinging on the type or duration of pen
register data or signaling information sought by law
enforcement.101
If the Pen/Trap Statute, CALEA, and the SCA are to be converged, such
intent should come from Congressional direction as opposed to DOJ
supposition: “The government’s concerns over the ‘ambiguity of the
statutes’ are well founded, but it is the Congress and not the Department
of Justice who is empowered to respond to those concerns.”102
Concluding, the USMJ wrote that as that statutory framework now
existed, prospective cell phone location information could only be
obtained upon the basis of an application grounded upon probable
cause.103

[I]f Congress wanted judges to grant disclosure of real time cell site
data by importing the procedural rules and safeguards of a statute that
Congress directed not be used to authorize the disclosure of
prospective cell site location data (the Pen Register statute) into a
statute and under a standard that Congress specifically reserved for
the production of historical telephone records (the SCA), Congress
could have and would have clearly said so. Congress did not.
Id. at 214-15.
100
Id. at 215. Recall that the “exception clause” is 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B).
101
WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 219. The logic of this argument does much to undermine
the theses underlying the SDNY#1 and WDLA decisions.
102
Id.
103
“The Court does not agree with the government that it should impute to Congress the
intent to ‘converge’ the provisions of the Pen Statute, the SCA and CALEA to create a
vehicle for disclosure of prospective cell location information on a real time basis on less
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Southern District of West Virginia—February 2006 (SDWVA)

Given the facts in the decision out of the Southern District of West
Virginia, the USMJ did not directly address the issue of what, if any,
statutes—alone or in combination—authorize federal law enforcement
agencies (“LEAs”) to acquire real-time location information of a cell
phone subscriber notwithstanding that the DOJ had specifically invoked
both the Pen/Trap Statute and § 2703 in support of its application.104
Here, the U.S. Marshals Service (“USMS”) was trying to locate a fugitive
who was using someone else’s cell phone.105 Thus, the fugitive was not
the paying customer of the cell phone service of investigative interest—a
fact the USMJ found determinative.106
Additionally, the USMJ gratuitously remarked that she was mindful
of all the earlier published opinions written by her USMJ colleagues on
the score and, like the majority of them, she was “unpersuaded by the
government’s argument that Chapters 206107 and 121108 [of Title 18,
U.S.C.], considered together, permit a court to authorize use of a pen
register and trap and trace device in order to locate a subscriber using a
cell phone in a geographical area, despite the provisions of 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)(1).”109 It was unnecessary, however, for her to specifically rule
on the matter in order to dispose of the case because only a subscriber
(who can also be a user), and not a mere user, i.e., one who is not also a

than probable cause.” Id. The court parenthetically noted that at least one bill, S. 2130,
109th Cong. (2006), sought to clarify the evidentiary standard necessary to obtain real
time/prospective cell phone location information. Id. at 219 n.6. Senate Bill 2130 would
require a Title III application—certainly a probable cause requirement—to obtain cell site
data. Also taking note of this bill, the SDNY#2 USMJ opined that “[i]f the Department of
Justice needs to obtain prospective cell site location information in criminal investigations, it
needs to ask Congress to explicitly grant it such authority.” SDNY#2, No. 06 CRIM. MISC.
01, 2006 WL 468300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006).
104
More particularly, the application before the USMJ sought
the use of a pen register which would capture and report at the same
time, originating and terminating ‘Cell Site Location Information,’
which is defined as information which identifies the antenna tower
receiving transmissions from that cell phone (and any information on
what portion of that tower is receiving a transmission, if available) at
the beginning and end of a particular telephone call made or received
by the cell phone’s user . . . .
SDWVA, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 664 (S.D. W. Va. 2006).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 666.
107
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000).
108
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000).
109
SDWVA, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
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subscriber, is protected under 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1).110 As a result, the
USMJ granted the government’s application—certainly based upon less
than probable cause—requiring the cell phone carrier to provide it with
“Cell Site Location information for all calls made to or from the subject
telephone for a period of sixty days from the date of [the court’s] Order,
or until the arrest of the subject fugitive, whichever comes first.”111
J.

Disrict of Maryland—February 2006 (DMD#2)

Three months after the government was denied an order for “real
time cell site information’ . . . whenever the phone was on,” the same
USMJ was asked for an order directing a wireless service provider to
surrender “cell site information concerning the physical location of
antenna towers associated with the beginning and termination of calls to
and from the subject cellular telephone.”112 Borrowing from both
§ 2703(d) and the Pen/Trap Statute (the hybrid theory), the government
“proffered ‘specific and articulable facts’” demonstrating that there were
“‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that” the information to be obtained
would be both “relevant and material” to its ongoing investigation.113
The court was as unimpressed with the government’s cobbled together
approach this time as it was the last:
the court DENIES the government’s request because the
proffered statutory authority is insufficient. Unless and
until Congress takes further action, the court may only
authorize disclosure of prospective cell site information
upon a showing of probable cause pursuant to Rule
41.114
The government protested that this application was different in three
particulars from the first: (1) it was now seeking location information
only at the inception and termination of calls, i.e., not also during the
course of them; (2) it now wanted to know the location of only one cell
tower “with which the target phone is communicating”; and (3) it sought
only the location information “stored” by the carrier.115
The
government’s attempt at differentiation was misplaced, countered the

Id. at 666.
Id.
112
DMD#2, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391 (D. Md. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
113
Id.
114
Id. The USMJ allowed that instead of using Rule 41, the government could also avail
itself of the more stringent Title III standard. Id. at 391 n.1.
115
Id. at 392.
110
111
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court, because the “earlier decision was not based on constitutional
grounds but on the lack of statutory authority . . . .”116 The court did,
however, rethink one aspect of its previous opinion and accepted “the
government’s contention that a mechanism that transmits cell site
information to the government falls within the definition of a pen
register in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) [because] . . . .[c]ell site information is
‘signaling information’ as discussed by [the Pen/Trap] statute[ ].”117
However, just because the CALEA segment at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)
precludes the sole use of the Pen/Trap Statute to secure such “signaling
information,” does not mean the USMJ bought into the government’s
hybrid argument:
[T]he court pauses before concluding, based on the
single word ‘solely,’ that Congress intended [CALEA]
§ 103(a)(2)118 to affirmatively authorize disclosure of cell
site information on a prospective basis through any
combination involving the Pen/Trap Statute.
An
equally valid interpretation of the ‘solely’ phrase is that
Congress intended that authority to locate subscribers
should derive largely, if not wholly, elsewhere. At best,
Congress was discouraging, not encouraging, reliance
on the Pen/Trap Statute for this purpose.119
Assuming arguendo that Congress intended that the Pen/Trap
Statute be used in conjunction with a second law in order that
prospective cell phone location information could be obtained, the court
said, that additional statute certainly could not be § 2703.120 “First, the
SCA simply is not and never was intended to be a statute that authorizes
prospective surveillance . . . . Second, § 103(a)(2) of CALEA was
predicated on Director Freeh’s assertion that the SCA and the Pen/Trap
Statute were distinct.”121 At the end of the day, concluded the USMJ, the
government’s hybrid theory “is at best murky and, at worst, illusory.”122

Id.
Id. at 393-94.
118
Codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2000).
119
DMD#2, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 394-95.
120
Id. at 395.
121
Id. “The SCA regulates access to records and communications in storage and
therefore lacks provisions typical of prospective surveillance statutes[ ]” such as set time
periods after which electronic surveillance must cease (absent renewal), reporting
requirements, and prescribed sealing requirements. Id. at 395 n.7.
122
Id. at 396.
116
117
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K. Southern District of New York—February 2006 (SDNY#2)
The USMJ who authored this opinion was completely at odds with
his colleague who wrote SDNY#1, thus setting up a split of authority
within the same federal judicial district.123 Basing its application upon
§ 2703(d), the government specifically sought authority to use a pen
register to
capture and report at the same time originating and
terminating cell site location information (specifically,
information which identifies the antenna tower
receiving transmissions from that cellphone (and any
information on what portion of that tower is receiving a
transmission, if available) at the beginning and end of a
particular telephone call made or received by the
cellphone’s user, which information is to be transmitted
from the cellphone’s service provider to the DEA and
other law enforcement agencies)[.]124
In denying the government’s application without reservation, the
USMJ parenthetically observed that prospective cell site location
information had been the frequent topic of USMJs both in the circuit and
around the country, but that even though a fellow USMJ in the Southern
District of New York had approved a comparable application by the
government, this USMJ came to the opposite conclusion.125 In siding
with the majority of USMJs who opined previously on the matter, the
USMJ saw little need to rephrase those opinions or, in his words, to
“reinvent the wheel,”126 but at the same time, he wanted to clearly set
forth his understanding of that “majority” position. He emphasized his
agreement with the prior cases that had rejected the “‘hybrid’ statututory
interpetation theory,” and thus declined to permit a combination of
CALEA, the SCA, and the Pen/Trap Statute to obtain “prospective cell
site location information.”127

123
Continuing, the USMJ observed that in so deciding he joined “eight decisions by
seven other Magistrate Judges (including [two] Magistrate Judges in this Circuit) in
concluding that statutory authority for prospective cell site location information is lacking.”
SDNY#2, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 468300, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006) (citations
omitted).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at *2.
127
Id.
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If the DOJ wants authority to obtain prospective cell site location
information based upon a less than probable cause standard, the court
concluded, it would be necessary to seek it from Congress. Addressing
the now-existing split within the Southern District of New York
regarding cell phone tracking, the USMJ urged the government to file
“timely objections to this Opinion with a Part I128 District Judge or
otherwise seeking appropriate review by an appropriate District
Judge.”129
L. Eastern District of California—March 2006 (EDCA)
In EDCA, the USAO sought information from a wireless service
provider that would be “expected to identify the specific cell tower(s)
‘handling’ the initiation, reception or maintenance of phone calls
associated with the specified cell phone.”130 Given recent precedent, the
USMJ surprisingly granted the government’s application “in all
particulars” by “proper[ly] adhering to established rules of statutory
construction[.]”131 The government’s hybrid theory—combining § 2703
with the Pen/Trap Statute—was and is a perfectly reasonable workaround addressing CALEA’s admonition that the Pen/Trap Statute
cannot be the “sole” statutory basis by which to obtain a cell phone
subscriber’s physical location.
Indeed, the USMJ castigated his
colleagues who penned the earlier decisions, accusing them of
using their “intuition” and going behind the plain
meaning of an otherwise unambiguous statutory text in
their use of legislative history . . . [to] conclude[ ] that
only a warrant issued on probable cause or perhaps a
wiretap application, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 aka “Title III,” will
do for obtaining cell site location information.132
The USMJ did, however, go out of his way to limit the scope of his
order to that cell phone location information generated during the course
of an actual wireless call. In other words, the authorization provided
128
See generally N.Y. R. USDCTSD DIV. BUS. R. 3, a portion of which states that “[p]art I is
established for hearing and determining certain emergency and miscellaneous matters in
civil and criminal cases and for processing criminal actions and proceedings through the
pleading stage.
Judges shall choose assignment to Part I from an appropriate
schedule . . . .” Id.
129
SDNY#2, 2006 WL 4688300, at *2.
130
EDCA, No.S-06-SW-0041, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2006).
131
Id. at *2.
132
Id. at *4. “Legislative history cannot be utilized to create ambiguity in an otherwise
unambiguous text.” Id. at *5.
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would not also extend to location information available at times when
the phone, although turned on and registering, was not being used at the
moment to make or receive a communication.
While it is reasonable to think of roaming signals from a
cell phone which is merely operative as signaling
information, Congress has indicated that it desires to
limit the acquisition of signaling information more
narrowly to require a communication[ ] . . . [which]
bespeaks the imparting of information by or between
persons via electronic means, not the mere, constant
contact of one machine with another machine.133
M. Southern Disrict of Texas—April 2006 (SDTX#2)
In this cell site tracking decision, the first by a U.S. District Judge, the
court allied itself with the reasoning in the three earlier decisions
granting the government limited relief because
in the present case the government has included
significant limits on the authorization it seeks. The
government is not seeking: (1) to activate remotely the
subject telephone’s GPS functionality; (2) to obtain
information from multiple cellular antenna towers
simultaneously to ‘triangulate’ the precise location of a
cell phone; or (3) to place calls to a particular cell phone
repeatedly or otherwise track on a continuous basis the
location of a cell phone when no call is being placed or
received.134
According to the court, the government here sought permission to
install a pen/trap device (as opposed to commanding a cell phone
provider to produce pen/trap information) in order to obtain “cell-site
information at the origin and termination of calls and, if reasonably
available, during the progress of a call that is not initiated by the
government itself.”135 Concluding that the government was only a little

133
Id. at *7 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (2000)). “Thus, a valid order permitting the
acquisition of signaling information refers only to the information generated by a phone
call, i.e., a communication.” Id.
134
SDTX#2, 433 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
135
Id.
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bit pregnant, the court opined that the government “met its statutory
burden under 18 U.S.C. § 3121 et seq. and § 2703(d).”136
N. Southern District of Indiana—June 2006 (SDIND)
This decision differs from all the others discussed in this article
because here the U.S. District Judge ruled—after the cell site location
information had been obtained—upon a defendant’s motion to suppress
the data received from a carrier pursuant to a USMJ order. This
contrasts with the other opinions covered in that they discuss whether,
in the first instance, an order directing a carrier to provide cell site
location information should even be entered. Here the tracking
information had been prospectively obtained following entry of a
USMJ’s 60-day order in response to the government’s pleading, the latter
having been based upon 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(B)(ii), 2703(d), 3124, or
some combination thereof.137 Based upon cell site location data obtained
from the carrier along with other cell phone location information
gathered with a deliberately unspecified government electronic device,
DEA, and the U.S. Marshals service determined that a phone belonging
to an indicted fugitive was located in a Chicago multi-unit dwelling.
The defendant raised the argument138 that “receipt of cellular site
information” as the result of the USMJ’s order approving of the
government’s hybrid theory “exceeded the limitations imposed by those
statutes [Pen/Trap and SCA] in permitting a cell phone to become a
tracking device.”139 Also, argued the defendant, any order permitting
acquisition of cell phone location information must be grounded upon
probable cause and not upon “specific and articulable facts.”140 The
court concluded that neither the SCA nor the Pen/Trap Statute

Id.
The text of the order, not a paragon of clarity, seems to indicate such. SDIND, No. IP
05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *1 n.5 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006); see also id. at *6
(indicating the government proceeded using its “hybrid” theory). However, footnote 15
states that the order to obtain cell site location information from the carrier for 60 days was
predicated upon 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Id. at *6 n.15. Note that the government secured the
arrest not only by relying only upon cell site location information received from a cell
phone service provider but from information received from one of the government’s own
cell phone tracking devices. Id. at *1 n.1.
138
Id. at *6. It is sometimes difficult to discern whether the court is addressing issues
surrounding acquisition of cell phone location information from the carrier or from the
government’s electronic device.
139
Id.
140
Id.
136
137
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“cover[ed] real time cell site information[.]”141 In finding the SCA
inapplicable, the court came to the now familiar conclusion that “real
time cell site information is not a ‘stored communication’ or record and
therefore is not covered by [18 U.S.C.] § 2703(c). Further, the title of the
section itself suggests that cell site information is not included.”142
Additionally, the court concluded that the Pen/Trap Statute could not
apply to prospective cell site location information because of the CALEA
exception.143 Its position eroding, the government countered that even if
the SCA and the Pen/Trap Statute did not provide a basis upon which to
undergird the order, neither did those statutes provide suppression as a
remedy. The court concurred: “We agree that the statutory language in
the Pen/Trap Act and the SCA does not mandate exclusion of such
evidence as the sanction for violations of those requirements, and in fact,
the [SCA] expressly rules out exclusion as a remedy.”144
If the government’s hybrid theory does not provide a basis for the
accumulation of real-time cell site location information, what does?
141
Id. at *7. Parenthetically, and somewhat bizarrely, the court said that Title I of ECPA,
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), consisted of “provisions governing tracking
devices.” SDIND, 2006 WL 3197181, at *7. Of the eleven sections in Title I, only one—
section 108—dealt with tracking devices. The purpose of section 108 was to add § 3117,
Mobile tracking devices, to Title 18, U.S. Code. Section 3117(a) (2000), which provides that if
a tracking device installation warrant or order is issued in one judicial district, it may be
monitored in all districts. Section 3117(b), does nothing more than provide a bland,
unremarkable definition of “tracking device” which is said to be “an electronic or
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.” To
suggest, therefore, that Title I is chock-full of tracking device provisions is to miss the mark.
In fact, the great bulk of ECPA’s Title I makes changes to Title III, Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968), the latter
having originally been enacted in 1968.
142
Id. The court accurately points out the “structural differences” between statutes
relating to the acquisition of historical records and those dealing with the collection of data
to be created in the future “suggest” the conclusion that “Congress did not intend the SCA
to cover real time tracking of a cell phone.” SDIND, 2006 WL 3197181, at *7 n.20.
Unlike the parts of the ECPA regulating real-time surveillance, the
SCA regulates access to records and communications in storage. As
such, the SCA imposes no limit on the duration of the government’s
access, no provision for renewal of the court order, no requirement for
periodic reports to the court by the government, and no automatic
sealing of court records. In contrast, all of these provisions appear in
statutes governing prospective surveillance like wiretap and pen/trap
orders.
Id.
143
Id. at *8.
144
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2000), Exclusivity of remedies, part of the SCA, which
provides that “The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter [i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 27012712] are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of the
chapter.”).
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Because the ECPA was not intended to affect the legal
standard for the issuance of orders authorizing these
devices [tracking devices], a Rule 41 probable cause
showing and procedures were (and still are) the
standard procedure to authorize the installation . . . of
mobile tracking devices.145
But a Rule 41/Fourth Amendment violation could occur in the case
of cell phone tracking only if there were a warrantless search. “In other
words, only if a Fourth Amendment privacy interest exists which would
be violated by the government’s mobile tracking of a cell phone, is a
warrant necessary for the search.”146 Researching the law in the Seventh
Circuit, the court could find no “binding precedent” which would
inform it whether a Rule 41 probable cause warrant were needed “before
the government can use cell site information to track a cell phone’s
location.”147 Relatedly the court could neither find any guidance
concerning whether a defendant has a suppression remedy if the
government fails to obtain a Rule 41 warrant to obtain cell site location
information.148 The court opinions which exist on the score, discussed in
this Article, “are procedurally distinguishable in that the issue arose
there when the government requested receipt of cell site information in a
warrant application[.]”149 In any event, the court concluded “that no
statutory basis exists for suppression of the evidence[ ]”150 which left
upright only a Fourth Amendment analysis.
Basing his argument on Kyllo v. United States,151 the defendant next
raised the compelling argument that because the tracking at issue
“intruded into his private dwelling [his apartment], as opposed to a
public place,” the warrantless gathering of cell site location information
constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.152 The court rejected this
contention, concluding that,
in Kyllo, law enforcement targeted the home to gain
information relating to activities underway inside. Here,
Id. at *10 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).
Id. The court added that “[t]he warrantless monitoring of a tracking device located in a
public place generally does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at *8 n.25 (citations
omitted; emphasis added).
147
Id. at *10.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at *11.
151
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
152
SDIND, 2006 WL 3197181, at **11-12.
145
146
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law enforcement officers targeted a particular phone
only as to its location . . . . [The law enforcement officer]
did not obtain any information regarding [the
defendant’s] home, beyond the fact that the target phone
was present in one of the three apartment units at [the
street address.]153
Additionally, and no doubt drawing upon United States v. Miller,154
the court concluded that the defendant brought law enforcement
scrutiny on himself by leaving his cell phone on, which “knowingly
exposed” his signaling information “to a third-party, to wit, the cell
phone company.”155
O. Northern District of Indiana—July 2006 (NDIND)
In a 2006 case out of the Northern District of Indiana, the
government appealed the denial of a cell site location application which
had been grounded upon the Pen/Trap-SCA hybrid theory, but the U.S.
District Judge upheld the USMJ to whom the pleading was initially
presented. Sought were both historical and “real time” location
information.
“Either way,” the court said, “the Government is
requesting an order requiring cellular phone companies to identify the
specific cell tower from which a call originates, is maintained, or received
for an incoming or outgoing call . . . . [S]uch information is unobtainable
absent a warrant.”156 Recalling that one thrust of CALEA was to ensure
that pen/traps could not be used to secure cell phone location
information, the court noted that the earlier decisions rejecting the
government’s hybrid theory did so because the purpose of the
government’s cell site location information request “is to accomplish
what Congress attempted to avoid, that is, permitting law enforcement
to track individuals using cell location information.”157 The court, like
many of the others before it, also examined (then) FBI Director Freeh’s
congressional ELSUR testimony and quoted with approval the EDWIS#1
USMJ who said that it made absolutely “no sense” to him “that, by use of
the word ‘solely’ in 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2), Congress was in some backhanded fashion intending to allow the SCA to be used in conjunction
Id. at *13.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see infra note 294 and accompanying text.
155
SDIND, 2006 WL 3197181, at *13. “Though the signal originated from within [the
defendant’s] residence, it was capable of being monitored outside the home.” Id. The final
nail in the defendant’s coffin was his lack of standing because the phone that was tracked
to his apartment belonged to someone else.
156
NDIND, Nos. 1:06-MC-6, 1:06-MC-7, 2006 WL 1876847, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006).
157
Id. at *4.
153
154

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 2

1446 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

with the Pen [Register] Statute to obtain the very information that
Director Freeh assured Congress he was not seeking authority to obtain
under the proposed legislation.”158 As a result, the court endorsed the
conclusion reached by the NDIND USMJ that
(1) the Government cannot rely on the Pen Register
Statute to obtain cell site location information; and (2)
converging the Pen Register Statute with the SCA in an
attempt to circumvent the exception in CALEA is
contrary to Congress’ intent to protect cell site location
information from utilization as a tracking tool absent
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.159
In the course of further explaining its denial of the government’s
application, the court again turned to the EDWIS#1 opinion, upon which
it heavily relied, where it was observed that any evidence of
congressional intent to allow the combined authority of the SCA and the
Pen Register Statute to provide the basis for obtaining cell site
information was missing from the statutes.160
P. Southern District of Texas—July 2006 (SDTX#3)
In light of the SDTX#2 opinion by a U.S. District Judge, and because
the government now limited the scope of its cell site location information
request, USMJ Smith (the author of SDTX#1) again considered a
government Pen/Trap-SCA hybrid application.161
The USMJ
emphasized that “[n]o published court opinion has yet agreed with the
government that unlimited cell site information is obtainable via the
combined authority of the Pen/Trap Statute, CALEA, and the SCA.”162
That said, and believing that SDNY#1 was the best opinion so far
which championed the government’s hybrid approach, in again denying
the government’s application, USMJ Smith proceeded to take on
SDNY#1 directly. The government’s statutory convergence theory, he
said, first proceeded from the belief that the Pen/Trap Statute is the
Id. at **12-13 (quoting EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 958 (E.D. Wis. 2006)).
Id.
160
Id. at *5 (quoting EDWIS#1, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 958).
161
“Invoking the same legal theory rejected by this court last fall, the Government again
seeks to obtain an order authorizing access to prospective cell site information as part of a
criminal investigation.” Id. The court unflatteringly referred to the Government’s hybrid
theory as a “three-rail bank shot.” SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
(quoting SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex 2005)).
162
SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
158
159
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“exclusive mechanism” by which cell phone “signaling” information
could be obtained.163 The USMJ dismissed this contention, saying that of
necessity it results in the illogical conclusion that “a judge who would be
compelled to grant a pen register application solely upon the
Government’s certification of relevance must deny that application if the
Government goes further and establishes probable cause under Rule
41.”164 In fact, one court had already determined that such a conclusion
was “absurd.”165 In particular, the “[l]egal process is calibrated to the
degree of intrusion. So ‘the greater the privacy interest at stake, the
higher the threshold Congress uses.’”166 Further the USMJ explained, the
Supreme Court had already specifically ruled in United States v. New York
Telephone Co.167 that pen register authorization could be secured with a
warrant satisfying Rule 41.168
The second peg upon which the government’s hybrid theory rested
is the conclusion that CALEA’s “solely pursuant” caveat mandates the
addition of a second, not-inconsistent grant of statutory authority—such
as the SCA—which, when paired with the Pen/Trap Statute, will permit
the acquisition of cell site location information. However, “CALEA
legislative history contains no clue that its drafters imbued the word
‘solely’ with the significance now attributed by hybrid proponents.”169
Further, “[t]he ‘solely pursuant’ phrase leaves open the possibility that a
pen/trap order may be neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain such
[cell site location] data . . . [It] may be one route, but not the only route,
to obtain cell site [location] information.”170
The third prong of the hybrid theory incorporates the SCA. But that
statute “expressly prohibits a phone company from disclosing subscriber
information ‘to any governmental entity,’ except under certain carefully
delineated circumstances[,]”171 and of the six exceptions, not one
mentions a conjoining with the Pen/Trap Statute. “In fact, the sixth
Id.
Id.
165
Id. (citing DMD#2, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 n.11 (D. Md. 2006)).
166
Id. at 829.
167
See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
168
“In support of its Rule 41 holding, the Court twice invoked a variant of the ‘greater
includes the lesser’ maxim: ‘[I]t would be anomalous to permit the recording of
conversations by means of electronic surveillance while prohibiting the far lesser intrusion
accomplished by pen registers.’” SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 830 (citing United States v.
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 170 (1977)).
169
SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
170
Id. at 832-33; see supra note 35; Alternative Legal Foundation, infra Part III.A.
171
SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
163
164

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 2

1448 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

exception (authorizing disclosure ‘to any person other than a
governmental entity’) underscores that the primary intent of the
prohibition was to guard against unwarranted access to subscriber
information by the government.”172 In sum, the USMJ concluded that the
government’s convergence or hybrid theory “self-destructs, its initial
premise at war with its intended conclusion.”173
Other factors also argue against the hybrid theory, to include “the
temporal gaps among the relevant statutes: 15 years between the ECPA
and the PATRIOT Act, 7 years between CALEA and the PATRIOT Act,
and 4 years between the effective dates of CALEA’s amendment of the
SCA and the CALEA proviso[.]”174 Coupled with this is the statement of
CALEA’s sponsor in the House describing the final bill as placing
limitations on law enforcement’s use of phones as tracking devices.175
Finally, another detraction from the hybrid theory is that none of the
opinions which have given it credence by permitting the acquisition of
limited cell site location information directly tackled the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3117(b) tracking device definition.176
Statutory infirmities aside, the hybrid theory also raises
unsatisfactorily addressed constitutional issues. “If the dual [hybrid]
theory were found to authorize the limited cell site data sought here, it
must necessarily authorize far more detailed location information, such
as triangulation and GPS data, which unquestionably implicate Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.”177 In short, the USMJ held fast to his
original opinion and looked askance at SDTX#2, the opinion by a U.S.
District Judge which intervened between USMJ Smith’s opinions in
SDTX#1 and SDTX#3.
Q. District of Maryland—July 2006 (DMD#3)
Notably this decision was authored by the USMJ who also wrote
both DMD#1 and DMD#2. The procedural history of the case is both
unusual and interesting. The government sought prospective cell site
location information for the purpose of apprehending a fugitive and it
presented sufficient probable cause evidence to underpin a Rule 41
Id.
Id. at 835.
174
Id.
175
Id. (internal citation omitted; emphasis added by USMJ).
176
Id.
177
Id. at 837. One truly cannot be just a little bit pregnant: “The constitutional problems
created by this [hybrid] interpretation of the electronic surveillance statutes are the same,
regardless of the breadth of cell site data sought in a given case.” Id.
172
173
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search warrant. The USMJ advised the government that he would issue
such a warrant upon submission of an affidavit, but the government
declined to do so
because it considered this a test case for its position that
an order to obtain prospective cell site information can
be entered upon less than probable cause pursuant to
the combined authority of [the Pen/Trap statute and the
SCA] provided the government offers “specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that . . . the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).178
But, having twice rejected the government’s hybrid theory before,
the USMJ did not hesitate to reject it a third time.179
R. Eastern District of Wisconsin—October 2006 (EDWIS)
Choosing again to beat its head against the wall yet another time, the
government relied upon its hybrid theory in seeking limited cell site
location information180 and lost before both the USMJ and the U.S.
District Judge to whom subsequent appeal was made.181 Framing the
issue, the court noted “that the issue is not whether the government can

DMD#3, 439 F. Supp. 2d 456, 456-57 (D. Md. 2006).
“I have twice rejected this [hybrid] position, as have the majority of other courts to
consider it. I advised the government that, without a sworn affidavit, I would deny its
application for prospective cell site information, and, to the extent the application seeks
such information, it is hereby DENIED.” Id. at 457.
180
The government sought “the originating and terminating cellular tower, a map of
tower locations, and the physical address of all cellular towers in the applicable market—
commonly referred to as the J-Standard[.]” EDWIS#2, No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743,
at *3 n.2 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006). The court recognized the “little bit pregnant” posture of
the government’s request for limited cell site location information, noting that “nothing in
its statutory argument would forbid it from obtaining triangulation information for the
entire cell or even when the phone is simply on but not in use. . . . Indeed, courts have
rejected similarly ‘narrowed’ requests.” Id. But what is the “J-Standard?” After
“extensive” discussions with the FBI, the J-Standard (J-STD-025) was established by the
Telecommunications Industry Assn. (“TIA”), “an accredited standard-setting
body[.] . . . [The J-standard], outlines the technical features, specifications, and protocols
for carriers to make subscriber communications and call-identifying information available
to law enforcement agencies having appropriate legal authorization.” U.S. Telecomm.
Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
181
Oddly, at some point the government appears to have abandoned its hybrid theory in
favor of a successful probable cause presentation before the USMJ. EDWIS#2, 2006 WL
2871743, at *3.
178
179
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obtain cell cite [sic] information. Rather, the issue is the standard it must
meet before a court will authorize such disclosure.”182 The court then
began its opinion by providing a hierarchical overview of the relevant
Federal statutes governing ELSUR: Title III, which the court dubbed a
“super warrant[,]”183 the SCA, which “imposes an ‘intermediate’
standard on the government[,]”184 and the Pen/Trap Statute, which
“requires the lowest quantum of information.”185 Completing that task,
the court also threw in both 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b), which rather unhelpfully
does nothing more than provide a definition of the term “tracking
device,” and CALEA, believing each was relevant to the issue at hand.
Inexplicably, and apparently incorrectly reading both Knotts186 and
Karo,187 the court then wrongly stated that “to obtain such a [tracking]
device, the government must meet the probable cause standard set forth
in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.”188 (As will be discussed below in Part III.A,
Alternative Legal Foundation, probable cause is definitely not needed in all
instances to install or monitor a tracking device.)189 However, the court
seems to correct itself by citing both Knotts and Karo before concluding
that “[i]t is doubtful that the government’s use of cell site information to
track a suspect implicates the Fourth Amendment, requiring use of the
probable cause standard as a constitutional matter.”190
The court summarized the Government’s hybrid argument as one
which contends that “the Pen/Trap statute must be coupled with some
other statute due to the restriction contained in CALEA.”191 The court
was adamant that this conclusion “is simply wrong”192 because “[a]s the
Supreme Court has held, authorization of a greater intrusion [e.g., Title
III, search warrant] necessarily authorizes a lesser intrusion [e.g., pen
register/trap and trace, cell site data].”193 Thus “there is no reason to
believe that CALEA requires the coupling of the Pen/Trap statute with
the SCA or any other statute, as opposed to requiring the government to

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
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Id. at *1.
Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
See United States v. Karo, 468 US 705 (1984).
EDWIS#2, 2006 WL 2871743, at *2.
See infra Part III.A.
EDWIS#2, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5 n.6.
Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4 nn.3-4 (internal citations omitted).
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make its request under Rule 41 or [18 U.S.C.] § 2518.”194 The court then
assessed whether the SCA, Rule 41, or 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) was “the best
source of authority for accessing telephone information.”195 Opting in
favor of Rule 41, and despite the government’s denial that cell site
information is a “tracking device” under § 3117(b), the court determined
that a Rule 41 probable cause warrant is “‘the standard procedure for
authorizing the installation and use of mobile tracking devices.’”196
Despite already having reached its conclusion that cell site location
information, if it is to be had at all, should be obtained by Rule 41 in
conjunction with 18 U.S.C. § 3117 or pursuant to Title III, the court
nevertheless entered upon an extended discussion of why the
government’s hybrid theory is unpalatable. First, to the extent the SCA
can be said to apply, cell site location information cannot come within its
ambit because the statute relates to “electronic communication service”
which in turn, provides users with the “ability to send or receive wire or
electronic communications.”197 But a wire communication is one
involving an “aural transfer,”198 which cell site location information is
not, and by its terms, an electronic communication does not include “any
communication from a [18 U.S.C. § 3117] tracking device[,]”199 which is
what a cell phone becomes when its signals are used to determine the
mobile’s whereabouts.
“‘Real-time location monitoring effectively
converts a cell phone into a tracking device . . . .’”200 Second, the SCA
relates to “stored” or historical information and not to prospectively
obtained data. In other words, the statute “pertains to the production of
existing records, not information that will be created in the future related
to future communications.”201 Third, although the SCA provides, by
exceptions, for the release of certain data to a “governmental entity,”202
none of the exceptions reference the Pen/Trap Statute.203 “Fourth, the
pairing of the Pen/Trap statute and the SCA—which were enacted at
different times (as was CALEA)—is not mentioned in any statute or

Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
Id. at *5 n.6.
196
Id. at *5 (citing SDTX#1, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005)).
197
18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2000).
198
Id. § 2510(1), (18).
199
Id. § 2510(c).
200
EDWIS#2, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5.
201
Id. at *6.
202
18 U.S.C. § 2701(c).
203
EDWIS#2, 2006 WL 2871743, at *6 (quoting SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 834 (S.D.
Tex. 2006)).
194
195
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specifically discussed in the legislative history.”204 Joining most courts
which have considered the issue to date, U.S. District Judge Adelman
concluded her opinion by rejecting the government’s hybrid theory and
requiring the government to meet the probable cause standard to obtain
cell site information.
S. Southern District of New York —October 2006 (SDNY#3)
In this appeal of SDNY#2,205 U.S. District Judge Kaplan, apparently a
strict constructionist, came to a result opposite that of Judge Adelman,
finding that even though Congress may not have explicitly intended that
the Pen Register Statute and the SCA be coupled together, the language
of the two Acts “clearly” authorized disclosure of cell site information.206
In constructing this conclusion, the court determined that the signals a
cell phone transmits to one or more towers to make a call constitutes
“signaling information” for purposes of the Pen Register Statute.207
Turning next to the “solely pursuant” language at 47 U.S.C.

Id. The Pen/Trap provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127, were originally enacted as part
of ECPA on October 21, 1986, amended by CALEA on October 25, 1994, and further
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001. Recall that the SCA was enacted
as title II of ECPA, see supra note 15.
205
Only limited tracking information was sought.
206
SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). In a nod toward sanity, the court
allowed that “Congress nevertheless may wish to consider whether this result is consistent
with its intention.” Id. The government here sought limited cell site location information
in the hope, one would think, that its limited request would be more likely to win judicial
favor. As noted earlier, however, such an approach is like arguing that one is but a little bit
pregnant. The court recognized this sophistry:
Many of the initial applications for cell site information sought
information that could be used for triangulation.
After these
applications were rejected by many courts, however, the government
began to request information regarding only one tower at a time,
apparently in the hope that applications for less detailed and invasive
information would meet with a warmer judicial reception. This
application is part of the latter group . . . .
The government’s
arguments for statutory authorization, however, apply equally
whether information is obtained from one antenna tower at a time or
from many simultaneously. Id. at 452 (internal citations omitted).
207
Id. at 455. Before citing United States Telecommunications Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 455
(D.C. Cir. 2000), as additional authority in support of this outcome, Judge Kaplan observed
that “[a] number of the judges to address this issue have reached the same conclusion, even
several who ultimately denied applications for cell site information for other reasons.”
SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 455. Responding unasked to those USMJs deciding to the
contrary, “. . . the Court presumes that Congress knew—when it added the term ‘signaling
information’ to the definitions of pen registers and trap and trace devices in 2001—that the
D.C. Circuit had interpreted that term to include cell site information in the United States
Telecomm. Ass’n decision a year earlier.” Id. at 456 (citation omitted).
204
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§ 1002(a)(2),208 the court determined that the “most natural” reading of
the provision is that cell site location information can properly be
disclosed “pursuant to the Pen Register Statute and some other statutory
authority.”209 Reaching a contrary conclusion, even if such is arguably
supported by legislative history,210 would mandate “reading the word
‘solely’ out of the statute entirely, which would violate ‘the settled rule
that the Court must, if possible, construe a statute to give every word
some operative effect.’”211 The next hurdle to the government’s hybrid
approach was the contention that prospective cell site information is not
cognizable under the SCA. Indeed, most of decisions already discussed
accepted the contention that “although [18 U.S.C. § 2703] might cover
historical cell site data, [it] does not authorize the disclosure of such data
on a ‘real-time’ or forward-looking basis.”212
Further blocking the adoption of the hybrid approach is the
argument that none of the traditional safeguards currently part of
ELSUR statutes exist after pairing the SCA with the Pen/Trap Statute,
e.g., there is no “limit [on] the duration of law enforcement surveillance
pursuant to a court order [nor is there a] require[ment for] automatic
sealing of such orders to maintain secrecy surrounding ongoing
surveillance.”213 The court found this dodge “unpersuasive” because, (1)
not only does the SCA not contain any surveillance time constraints
which would circumscribe the collection of prospective cell site location
information, but even more importantly, (2) “the information the
government requests is, in fact, a stored, historical record because it will
be received by the cell phone service provider and stored, if only
momentarily, before being forwarded to law enforcement officials.”214 A
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
210
Id. “Indeed, both the Senate and House Reports on CALEA asserted that the
respective bills ‘expressly provide[ ] that the authorization under the pen register and trap
and trace orders cannot be used to obtain tracking or location information, other than that
which can be determined from the phone number.’” Id. at 457-58 (internal citations
omitted).
211
Id. at 458 (citation omitted).
212
Id. at 459.
213
Id. “Several of the magistrate judges and amicus [Federal Defenders of New York]
here contend that if Congress had intended the Stored Communications Act to permit
prospective surveillance, ‘it would have included the same prospective features it built into
the wiretap and pen/trap statutes.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
214
Id. (citing SDNY#1, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). The fact that there
may be momentary storage should be beside the point. What should matter is that the
government’s application seeks information not yet in existence at the time an order would
be signed. Further, see supra note 29, cell site location information can be pushed both to
law enforcement and the service provider at the same time.
208
209
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third reason supporting rejection of the amicus’s argument is that the
Pen/Trap Statute—to which the SCA would be metaphorically glued—
does have ELSUR duration limitations which would result from a
pairing with the Pen/Trap Statute.215 A final argument raised against
the marriage of the Pen/Trap Statute with the SCA is that part of the
latter, 18 U.S.C. § 2711, incorporates definitions from Title III and, more
particularly, the definition of “electronic communication” which, in turn,
specifically excludes “any communication from a tracking device (as
defined in section 3117)[.]”216 The court also found this contention to be
“unpersuasive” and even considers resolution of the question whether a
cell phone meets the statutory definition of a “tracking device” to be
“immaterial” because 18 U.S.C. § 2703 allows a court “upon a proper
showing, to order disclosure of “a record or other information pertaining
to a subscriber to or a customer of an electronic communications service.” It
does not authorize the disclosure of an “electronic communication.”217
Cherry picking statutory provisions even further, the court also
concluded that,
because a cell phone provider is an “electronic
communications service” and cell site information is a
“record or other information pertaining to a subscriber
to or a customer of” the cell phone provider, the logical
conclusion is that Sections 2703(c) and (d) permit a court
to order the disclosure of prospective cell site
information upon a proper showing by the government.
The Stored Communications Act, then, provides the
additional authority for cell site information required by
CALEA.218

215
“The Stored Communications Act is being asked to play only the supporting role of
providing the required additional authorization for the disclosure of information already
permitted by the Pen Register Statute. Accordingly, it makes sense that the Pen Register
Statute would provide the procedural framework.” SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 459. If, as
the District Judge posits, the pen/trap plays the principal role in the unclean, bizarre
conjoining of the pen/trap and SCA provisions, then why does the CALEA admonition at
47 U.S.C. § 1002 against using pen/trap authority to locate cell phones not also play a
primary (as opposed to supporting) role?
216
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2000). Recall that 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) tells us that a “‘tracking
device’ [is] an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement
of a person or object.”
217
SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 460.
218
Id. at 460-61.
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The court then addressed the concern expressed by many of the earlier
opinions that to the extent a cell phone is a § 3117 tracking device, an
order permitting the provision of cell site location information to the
government must be predicated upon probable cause. The court
correctly pointed out that by its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 3117 advises that a
“warrant or other order”219 may be secured upon an adequate showing
thus permitting court authorization to issue upon less than probable
cause.220 More significantly, the court correctly noted that § 3117 relates
only to the installation and not the monitoring of a tracking device.221
Amici raised an interesting but flawed argument when they stated
that, statutes aside, the Fourth Amendment mandates a probable causegrounded warrant because Karo222 requires such an order “if the device
would disclose its location inside a person’s home and that information
could not have been observed from public spaces.”223 The court
conceded that a Karo violation is within the universe of possibilities but
that a Karo analysis at this juncture would be premature.224 As a result,
the court granted the government’s hybrid theory-based application for
limited cell-site location information.225
T. Eastern District of California—February 2007 (EDCA#2)
In another of the relatively few opinions favorable to the
government, the same USMJ who authored EDCA#1 recited that in an
earlier order he had determined that cell site location information
constituted “subscriber information accessible to law enforcement upon
Id. at 461.
“Accordingly, Section 3117 specifically ‘contemplates that a tracking device may be
installed pursuant to an ‘order’—that is, without a warrant and thus without a probable
cause showing’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
221
Id. at 453; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a).
222
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
223
SDNY#3, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
224
“At this point, however, the Court has no way of knowing if the government will use
any cell site information it obtains in this manner. If it does, and information leads to
indictment, the issue can be litigated on a motion to suppress.” Id.
225
Rather unartfully, the court stated that use of
The pen register and/or trap and trace device is authorized to capture
(1) the calls made and received by the subject cell phone and (2)
information which identifies the antenna tower receiving
transmissions from that cell phone at the beginning and end of a
particular telephone call made or received by the telephone’s user,
including any information on what portion of that tower is receiving a
transmission at the beginning and end of a particular telephone call.
Id. at 463. The court’s phrasing is unartful because “capturing calls made and received”
would require a Title III.
219
220
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order”226 grounded upon the government’s hybrid theory. Note that in
the course of his decision, USMJ Hollows determined that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3117(b) “does not include the acquisition of cell site information in the
terms ‘tracking device’” because that statute has to be understood in the
context of when it was enacted as part of ECPA in 1986 and upon so
doing, it is clear that the “device contemplated” by § 3117(b) “was only
of the ‘beeper’ variety.”227 Looking to § 3117(b)’s legislative history, the
USMJ also concluded that the acceptance of previously recorded location
information from a cell phone company was not “installation of a
device.”228
Intriguingly, and in a parenthetical footnote, the court said—
seemingly at variance with Karo229—that tracking a cell phone being used
inside a residence is actually,
all done outside the home via cell towers. Unless the
agents are calling the suspect’s phone, the agents have
no control over the suspect’s use of the cell phone
whatever in his location, did not cause or initiate the cell
phone signal, and are not keying in on the cell phone
signal inside the home. Mathematical triangulations made
from different cell phone towers outside the home which
will reveal a general area where the suspect may be
found is hardly probing inside the house.230
This Article has demonstrated that in the great majority of opinions
where the matter has arisen, courts have opined that the government’s
hybrid or convergence approach is legally bankrupt and that only a
Fourth Amendment/Rule 41 warrant is an acceptable underpinning for
an order directing cell phone carriers to provide cell phone location
information to law enforcement. In the discussion which follows,
however, a third, largely untried option is suggested.

EDCA#2, No. 07-SW-034 GGH, 2007 WL 397129, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2007).
Id. at *2.
228
Id at * 1 n.1.
229
Supra note 7. Recall that in Karo, however, the tracking was made possible by a
government-installed device which was emanating signals as a result of that installation.
230
EDCA#2, 2007 WL 397129, at *1 n.2.
226
227
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Alternative Legal Foundation
Instead of continued pursuit of a legal offensive underpinned by the
Pen/Trap Statute, the SCA, CALEA, or a hybrid of some or all of the
three, it may be appropriate to take a step backwards and attack from a
different vector, from another direction—one not based upon a
precarious statutory mélange but upon fundamental Fourth Amendment
law.
Knotts231 and Karo232 teach that electronically monitoring the changing
location of an object or a person is not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment so long as the shifting situs of the thing being
tracked could be determined by visual observation made from a spot
where one is legally permitted to be, e.g., from a public highway. This
result follows because such observations do not intrude upon an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. If there is no search, there is no need for a warrant based
upon probable cause. So long as the surveilled person or object is neither
within a curtilage that is not open to public observation or within a
residence, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy attached to the
movements of the person or object.233
Both cases were decided in the 1980s, i.e., a decade before CALEA,
and the second decision followed closely on the heels of the first, just a
year later. It may be helpful to review the facts in both of these opinions.
Often there are four events in connection with the utilization of a
“traditional” tracking device each of which could implicate the Fourth
Amendment:
installation, repair/maintenance, monitoring, and
removal. Inasmuch as Knotts never contested the legality of the device’s
installation, the case bearing his name only concerned monitoring.234

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
233
Put differently, the key questions is whether, “without a warrant, the Government
surreptitiously employs an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of [a] house.” Id. at 715.
234
As a practical matter, there was nothing to contest: With the consent of a chemical
manufacturer, Minnesota law enforcement personnel installed a “beeper” inside a 5-gallon
container of a precursor chemical, chloroform, useful in the production of controlled
substances. When one of the defendants bought the chloroform, the officers were able to
follow it from Minneapolis to just outside Knott’s “secluded cabin near Shell Lake,
Wis[consin].” Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. “Under a barrel outside the cabin, officers located the
five-gallon container of chloroform.” Id. at 279.
231
232
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Law enforcement personnel were able to track a five-gallon chloroform
container with a “beeper” hidden therein as it was driven to the exterior
of a lakeside cabin owned by Knotts.235 Warrantless monitoring of the
“beeper” or tracking device, Knotts contended, violated the Fourth
Amendment. But the Supreme Court found otherwise:
A person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his movements from one place to another. When [the
co-defendant] travelled over the public streets he
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the
fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made,
and the fact of his final destination when he exited from
public roads onto private property.236
That the chloroform came to rest on private property was of no
consequence because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect “to movements of [conveyances and] objects such as the
drum of chloroform outside the cabin in the ‘open fields.’”237 The
expectation was lessened because the tracking device revealed nothing
more than what the police could have seen had they chosen to tail the
driver all the way to Knotts’ cabin.238 “Visual surveillance from public
places along [the driver’s] route or adjoining Knotts’ premises would
have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police.”239 Since the
monitoring did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy, neither
a search nor a seizure under the Fourth Amendment took place.240
The facts in Karo were surprisingly similar. Karo and his codefendants ordered fifty gallons of ether which were to be used to
extract cocaine from imported clothing previously impregnated with the

235
Based upon information in addition to that supplied by the tracking device, law
enforcement personnel secured a search warrant, raided the cabin, and discovered an
“operable” clandestine drug laboratory containing enough precursors “to produce 14
pounds of pure amphetamine.” Id.
236
Id. at 281-82. Knotts “undoubtedly had the traditional expectation of privacy within a
dwelling place insofar as the cabin was concerned[.]” Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
237
Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).
238
“But there is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information
as to the movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been
visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin . . . . [N]otions of physical trespass based on
the law of real property [are] not dispositive.” Id. (emphasis added).
239
Id.
240
Id.
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drug, but unfortunately for Karo, the vendor he chose was an informant
who permitted DEA to substitute an ether container equipped with a
tracking device.241 DEA was thus able to track the container’s rather
circuitous route as it was transferred from place to place and vehicle to
vehicle, until it was driven to a house rented by three of Karo’s codefendants. Because of the threat of compromise, the agents were
unable to conduct tight visual surveillance, and thus did not know
whether the ether remained in a vehicle parked outside or had been
moved in or around the house. After all of the defendants’ vehicles left,
however, agents could tell by the signal from the at-rest tracking device
that the ether remained at the house.
The vendor’s consent obviated the need for an installation warrant,
but was a court order nonetheless needed to monitor the tracking device
that had been hidden in the ether container? The question was squarely
presented to the Supreme Court: does “monitoring of a beeper in a
private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violate[ ] the
Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the
privacy of the residence[?]”242 Concluding that the Fourth Amendment
had been contravened in this instance, the court was quick to contrast the
facts with those in Knotts, “for there the beeper told the authorities
nothing about the interior of Knotts’ cabin.”243 Here, on the other hand,
“the Government surreptitiously employ[ed] an electronic device to
obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from
outside the curtilage of the house.”244 As a result, the court maintained
241
In addition to the vendor’s consent allowing installation of the tracking equipment,
DEA had obtained a warrant permitting both installation and monitoring. United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1983). Defendants successfully challenged the sufficiency of the
warrant (because it contained misleading statements) which left the Supreme Court to
determine the legality of the (now) warrantless installation and monitoring. Id. at 710, 718
n.5.
242
Id. at 714.
243
Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
244
Id.
The beeper tells the agent that a particular article is actually located at
a particular time in the private residence and is in the possession of the
person or persons whose residence is being watched. Even if the
visual surveillance has revealed that the article to which the beeper is
attached has entered the house, the later monitoring not only verifies
the officers’ observations but also establishes that the article remains
on the premises.
Id. But is this comment accurate? If circumstances were otherwise and had there been no
concern about the compromise of physical surveillance, DEA could have ringed the house
360° with binocular-equipped agents and would have learned the same information
reported by the tracking device—that the ether had been moved from a vehicle to the
inside of the house where it then remained. The device was not, apparently, sufficiently
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“the general rule that a search of a house should be conducted pursuant
to a warrant.”245
Twenty years after Knotts and Karo, the Sixth Circuit got it right.
Recall the facts in Forest246—DEA dialed the cell phone of one of the
defendants (but did not let the phone ring). DEA then queried the
service provider and learned what cell towers were being “hit” by the
phone, thus learning the defendant’s general location. This enabled DEA
to re-establish physical surveillance of the target. Among other things,
the defendant argued that DEA “effectively turned his cellular phone
into a tracking device . . . .” in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.247 Forest tried to argue that the facts in his case were different
from those in Knotts and that the “cell-site data provided information
that the DEA agents could not have obtained simply by following his
car.”248 But it is not what the agents saw or did not see that matters;
rather, it is what could have been observed by third parties that counts.
The court emphasized that “[a]lthough the DEA agents were not able to
maintain visual contact with [the defendant’s] car at all times, visual
observation was possible by any member of the public. The DEA simply
used the cell-site data to ‘augment[ ] the sensory faculties bestowed upon
them at birth,’ which is permissible under Knotts.”249
The defendant then argued that if he did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to his location, he did have one with
respect to the “cell-site data itself.”250 This protection existed, according
to the defendant, because: (1) unlike the situation presented in Knotts,

discriminating or accurate to reveal in which room or on which floor the ether came to rest.
Because the device disclosed no information in addition to what could have been
discovered by 360° visual surveillance, arguably the Supreme Court was incorrect in its
analysis and no monitoring warrant should have been required. The tracking device
indicated only that it was inside the house and at no point did it reveal what law
enforcement personnel could have discerned with the five senses had they been inside the
residence in lieu of the tracking device. Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of
thermal imaging device to detect heat emanating from the interior of a residence
constitutes a search). “We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.” Id. at 34
(internal citations omitted).
245
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 718.
246
United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
247
Id.
248
Id. at 951.
249
Id. (internal citations omitted).
250
Id.
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neither the transmitting nor receiving instruments belonged to the
government; (2) the defendant’s contract with the service provider did
not authorize disclosure of his cell-site data; and (3) the information DEA
obtained by “pinging” his phone was not the result of any affirmative
action on his part, i.e., unlike the situation in Smith v. Maryland,251
because he had not dialed any outgoing digits nor was he in
communication with anyone when DEA dialed his phone.252 The Sixth
Circuit was unimpressed, opining that any difference between the
defendant’s location and his cell-site data was one without a
distinction.253 Given the facts of the case, it simply was “not legally
significant” because the “cell-site data is simply a proxy for [the
defendant’s] observable location.”254 Consequently, the court found
Knotts to be controlling and thus concluded that DEA had not conducted
a Fourth Amendment search.255
Contrary to the warning expressed in DMD#1, law enforcement has
historically acted at “its peril” and yet suffered no epidemic of adverse
consequences by engaging in the warrantless, electronic monitoring of
tracking devices installed within or on conveyances and objects that
travel on publicly accessible highways, waters, and airspace. Where is
the legal consistency in requiring a different result just because the
location-identifying equipment belongs to parties other than the
government? The nature of the information obtained by the government
is the same, whether from its own radio equipment or from a cell phone
service provider.256 The majority of USMJs, having lost sight of this, are
letting the tail wag the dog.
Concededly, it is certainly possible and permissible for a statute to
impose more stringent requirements upon police during the
performance of law enforcement activity than constitutionally provided
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979).
Id.
253
Id.
254
Forest, 355 F.3d at 951.
255
Id. at 951-52.
256
When government-owned devices are utilized, law enforcement has dominion and
control over the receiver and has at least dominion over the transmitter. When cell phones
are tracked, the transmitter, i.e., the cell phone, is controlled by the user and the receiving
equipment is typically within both the dominion and control of the service provider.
Installation of a government-owned device will often require an intrusion to install the
device; such an incursion in many instances occasions the infringement of a privacy
interest that society would judge to be reasonable thus necessitating a Rule 41 warrant.
However, no installation need be effected when a cell phone is the tracking device. Thus,
the use of a cell phone to determine a user’s location can be less invasive than utilization of
a government setup.
251
252
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baselines. However, neither the Pen/Trap Statute nor § 2703 imposes
even a probable cause requirement and, in any event, seventeen of the
cases just discussed determined that the two laws are simply
inapplicable. 257 As already mentioned, this is because (1) the Pen/Trap
Statute cannot be applied to cell phone tracking inasmuch as 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)(2)(B), part of CALEA, instructs that the specific location or callidentifying information such “devices” can provide “shall not include
any information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber”; and (2) § 2703 relates to stored or historical information as
opposed to that which is acquired—as is also the case with Title III
orders and pens/traps—in real-time.
B. Director Freeh’s Remarks in Context
At least three of the USMJ cases258 discussed Director Freeh’s 1994
remarks, which were made immediately prior to CALEA’s passage so it
would do well to correctly understand the historical timeframe in which
they were made.259
As previously noted,260 the Pen/Trap Statute was enacted as part of
ECPA in 1986, and it was then that both apparatuses were first defined:
they were both declared to be “devices”261 and not “devices” plus
“processes”—as has been the case ever since the instruments’ meanings
were amended fifteen years later by the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act.262 In
short, at the time when Director Freeh presented his 1994 prepared
statement to the joint meeting of the Hill subcommittees, pen registers as
But cf. Title III vis-à-vis the Fourth Amendment.
See EDWIS, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006); WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211
(W.D.N.Y. 2006); DDC#2, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2005).
259
Louis J. Freeh, Director, F.B.I., Statement before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Technology and the Law and the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights (Mar. 18, 1994), reprinted in Federal Document Clearing House, 1994
WL 223962 [hereinafter Freeh Testimony].
260
See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
261
See supra note 1. The ECPA set forth the definitions of both terms at Section 103
thereof. Section 103, in turn, set forth original chapter 206 of 18 U.S.C. which included the
definition of “pen register” at what was then (1986), the new 18 U.S.C. § 3126(3), as
a device which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which
identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone
line to which such device is attached, but such term does not include
any device used by a provider or customer [for billing, recording as
incident to billing, cost accounting, or other like purpose].
Similarly, (then) new 18 U.S.C. § 3126(4) defined “trap and trace” as a “device which
captures incoming or other impulses which identify the originating number of an
instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted[.]”
262
These amendments occurred some seven years after Director Freeh’s testimony.
257
258

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/2

Clark: Cell Phones as Tracking Devices

2007]

Cell Phones as Tracking Devices

1463

well as trap and trace devices were somewhat rudimentary mechanical
instruments that required physical connection to telephone wires in
order to be able to print out the digits customers actually dialed, as well
as the times of day traditional telephones went on and off-hook when
making or receiving calls. The pen/trap devices, as statutorily defined
in 1986, were thus incapable of determining cell phone locations—a not
unusual instance where legislation lagged behind technological advance.
According to a cell phone industry association, the use of cell phones in
the United States did not even commence until the mid-1980s. 263
Examined against this backdrop, at the time Director Freeh’s
remarks were presented to the two subcommittees meeting jointly,
pen/trap “processes” made possible by computer software which would
permit the record-keeping of some cell phone location information was a
somewhat distant, if not unimagined vision—especially for law
enforcement investigative uses—which explains his somewhat indefinite
comment that “[s]ome cellular carriers do acquire information relating to
the general location of a cellular telephone for call distribution [as
opposed to user tracking] analysis purposes.”264 Thus, the entire portion
(captioned Allegations of “Tracking” Persons265) of his prepared statement
must be viewed through this lens. The practice of securing real-time cell
phone location information for law enforcement purposes from wireless
service providers was in its infancy, and could not yet be considered an
arrow in the police quiver. Thus, Director Freeh conceived of cell phone
location information as data only for business—”call distribution
analysis purposes”—and not, in his words, for the sort of “true tracking”
engaged in by law enforcement for criminal investigative purposes.
Yet “true tracking” was the practice discussed in both the Knotts and
Karo decisions, of which the Director was well aware.266 Both matters

263
According to the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association—The
Wireless Association, the first commercial cellular system began operation in the United
States (Chicago) in October 1983; the second system started in December 1983 in the
Baltimore/Washington, D.C. corridor. By 1986, there were only 1,000 cell sites in the
country. There were 10 million cell phone users in the U.S. by 1992 and 10,000 cell sites. By
1997, the number of cell sites had risen to 50,000. There are now over 100 million wireless
subscribers in the U.S.
See generally Cellular Telecommunications and Internet
Association—The Wireless Association, The History of Wireless, http://www.ctia.org/
content/index.cfm/AID/101 (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
264
See WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added); Freeh Testimony,
supra note 259 (emphasis and explanation provided).
265
See Freeh Testimony, supra note 259, at 32-33.
266
Director Freeh even provided a citation to United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984),
supra note 259.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 2

1464 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

were decided a decade before the Director’s statement and held that no
Fourth Amendment probable cause orders/warrants were needed to
track the movements of suspects traveling out in public. Conversely,
“‘true’ tracking” “require[s] a warrant or court order when used to track
within a private location not open to public view.”267 Cell phone location
“transactional” information obtained and retained for business
purposes--and thus not “true tracking” information—could be secured
from the service providers by law enforcement with either “court orders
or subpoenas” as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2703.268 The Director knew the
difference between subpoenas, court orders, and warrants. Warrants
were needed for real-time tracking if the target were “within a private
location not open to public view.” No warrants were required, therefore
(as Knotts and Karo instructed), for all other real-time tracking.
Thus, when Director Freeh said that “call setup information”—real
time dialing data traditionally obtained by pen/trap instruments which
“identifies the origin and destination of a wire or electronic
communication,”269—would not also “include any information that may
disclose the physical location of a mobile facility or service beyond that
associated with the number’s area code or exchange,”270 he was speaking
of the information then known to be obtainable by pen/trap
instruments. This “call setup information” was in contrast with
“transactional” data, which includes generalized location information
that in 1994 was understood to be data kept by carriers “for call
distribution analysis purposes” and thus considered to be historical
records that law enforcement could obtain “exclusively” via 18 U.S.C.,
chapter 121 (the SCA).271
Put differently, and in Director Freeh’s mind, the CALEA caveat
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B)—which provides that callidentifying information obtained by pens/traps “shall not include any
information that may disclose the physical location” of the subscriber—
had nothing to do with and cannot be seen as a restriction upon real-time
cell phone location information that carriers are today (well post-1994)

Karo, 468 U.S. 705.
See Freeh Testimony, supra note 259, at 33 (emphasis added) (recalling that ECPA,
including 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710, the SCA, was enacted in 1986—eight years before the
Director’s testimony).
269
E-mail is an example of an “electronic communication” and, in that context, an
example of a “communication address” that is “similar” to a telephone number would be
an e-mail address.
270
Id.
271
Id. at 31.
267
268
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capable of providing via pen/cell “processes” to law enforcement. In
order to engage in a legislative history analysis, the 1994 CALEA
constraint upon pen/trap “devices” cannot be applied to 2006 pen/trap
“processes.”
C. Operating in “Peril”
Recall that the DMD#1 USMJ cautioned that “[t]o the extent the
government seeks to act without a warrant, the government acts at its
peril, as it may not monitor an electronic tracking device in a private place
without a warrant.”272
This remark is consistent with the
aforementioned 1994 testimony of FBI Director Freeh as well as the
lessons from both Knotts and Karo. The majority of the USMJs failed to
latch on to the seemingly obvious notion that the cell phone location data
sought by the government from the service providers did not—
according to the facts of each case—originate from such a private place.
Thus, no probable cause-based court orders or Rule 41 search warrants
were constitutionally required to conduct the location surveillance
requested.
Further, the exactitude of real time cell phone location information
currently available from service providers is insufficient to determine the
floor or room within a residence where the cell phone user is situated.
Thus, if all that current, technologically obtainable real time cell phone
location data can reveal is that a suspect is inside a residence, how can
this information nugget be more invasive than the visual observation to
the same effect by agents armed with binoculars encircling the area?273
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 2004) (recalling that “cell-site
data is simply a proxy for [the cell phone user’s] observable location”). Let’s assume for
the sake of argument—binoculars aside for the moment—that a police determination of the
target’s mere presence (without more) inside a residence or protected-from-view curtilage is
an invasion of privacy that society would recognize to be unreasonable absent a warrant.
Should the chance, even if remote, that the suspect may venture into a residence (his? hers?
someone else’s?) preclude a law enforcement agency from securing cell phone location
information from a wireless service provider? Even if this were the case, a suggested workaround would be to borrow from the minimization requirements of Title III [18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(5)] so that at such time as it became apparent that the subject was about to enter a
constitutionally-protected area, the law enforcement agency would cease reception of the
cell phone location information from the service provider subject, of course, to the periodic
re-initiation of reception every several minutes to ensure that the target has not departed.
Note that in the case of foreign language Title III (communication content) intercepts, even
after-the-fact minimization is permissible in certain instances, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5): “In the
event the intercepted communication is in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that
foreign language or code is not reasonably available during the interception period,
minimization may be accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception.”

272
273
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The DMD#1 USMJ was more on the mark than perhaps he realized
when he said that, “[i]f acquisition of real time cell site information is
equivalent to a tracking device, it would seem the government is not
constitutionally required to obtain a warrant provided the phone
remains in a public place where visual surveillance would be
available.”274
Bingo. How is it, then, that the USMJs proceeded from the
unremarkable but prescient statement just quoted to the mandate that
such information can be procured only with a Rule 41 warrant? It truly
boggles the mind; certainly logic does not inspire (let alone compel) such
a conclusion.
D. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, the All Writs Act, and the Inherent
Power of the Courts
As indicated earlier, before the Pen/Trap Statute was enacted in
1986, the situation was not unlike it is today with cell phone location
information: an order compelling the assistance of a third party was
needed so that law enforcement could gain access to information it
needed to further a criminal investigation—even though the order was
not constitutionally mandated inasmuch as the desired information was
unworthy of constitutional protection. 275 The absence of a statute
specifically setting forth a regime for pen/trap orders did not
meaningfully hinder law enforcement prior to 1986. Effective orders
were secured using a combination of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
57(b) (“Rule 57”),276 the All Writs Act,277 and the court’s inherent power.
Use of these in combination, although suggested by dicta in United States

Certainly the interception of communication content impinges upon Fourth Amendment
considerations much more than does cell phone user location information.
274
See DMD#1, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (D. Md. 2005).
275
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
276
Rule 57(b) reads in part that “[a] judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent
with federal law, these rules, and local rules of the district.” See also SDTX#3, 396 F. Supp.
2d 747, 830 n.31 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
277
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000), states
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. (b) An
alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a
court which has jurisdiction.
A rule or decree nisi is “[a] court’s decree that will become absolute unless the adversely
affected party shows the court, within a specified time, why it should be set aside.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 441 (8th ed. 2004).
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v. New York Telephone Co.278 proved to be a workable, pre-Chapter 206
stratagem.279
Instead of using the largely unsuccessful hybrid theory, federal
prosecutors should consider steering clear of the inapplicable Section
2703, the Pen/Trap Statute, and CALEA (that well is already poisoned)
and instead rely upon the arguments found successful in Knotts,280
Karo,281 and Forest282 when seeking an order based upon Rule 57(b), the
All Writs Act, and the court’s inherent authority. Although the Justice
Department frowns on such an approach, it certainly could not fare any
worse than proceeding upon the hybrid theory.
Of the USMJ decisions chronicled above, only three discussed the
Rule 57(b) and/or the All Writs Act approach, EDNY#2, SDTX#3,283 and,
in passing, WDNY.284 Although the EDNY#2 USMJ did not question the
“correctness” of the earlier decisions upholding orders based upon the
All Writs Act, he nevertheless “conclud[ed] that they [did] not advance
the government’s cause here.”285 This was because the decisions

278
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 170 (1977). At the time New York Telephone
Co. was decided, Rule 57(b) read that “[i]f no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule,
the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or any
applicable statute.” Id. The communication carrier in New York Telephone Co. had refused
to help the FBI install a pen register despite the existence of an order supported by
probable cause, arguing that an order adhering to the more stringent Title III standard was
required. Id. Although we now know from a subsequently decided case that probable
cause need not have been proffered, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the FBI had,
in fact, grounded its application upon that level of proof. Even though Rule 41, by its
terms, spoke only of solid objects until this past December, the rule was “not limited to
tangible items but [was] sufficiently flexible to include within its scope electronic
intrusions . . . .” N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 169. Buttressing that conclusion, the court
remarked that its
conclusion that Rule 41 authorizes the use of pen registers . . . is
supported by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 57 (b). . . . Although we need not
and do not decide whether Rule 57(b) by itself would authorize the
issuance of pen register orders, it reinforces our conclusion that Rule
41 is sufficiently broad to include seizures of intangible items such as
dial impulses recorded by pen registers as well as tangible items.
Id. at 170.
279
See, e.g., United States v. Mosko, 654 F. Supp. 402, 405 (D. Colo. 1987) (pre-ECPA/All
Writs Act order issued for pen register operations).
280
United States v. Knotts, 60 U.S. 276 (1982).
281
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
282
United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004).
283
SDTX#3, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 831 n.31 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
284
In a footnote, the WDNY USMJ simply adopted the position advanced by the EDNY#2
USMJ. WDNY, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219-20 n.7 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
285
EDNY#2, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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championed by the government were, in the USMJ’s view, not
sufficiently on all fours with the facts before him. In United States v.
Mosko, for example, the defendant challenged the pen register evidence
against him on the ground that the underlying order should have been
based upon probable cause.286 In rejecting the defendant’s suppression
request, the Mosko court correctly cited to Smith287 when observing that a
pen register order need not be grounded upon probable cause
and─without embellishment or conclusion─observed that the pen
register order had been secured in reliance upon the All Writs Act.
“Second,” remarked the court in EDNY#2, “none of the cited cases relied
on the All Writs Act to trump existing statutory law governing the use of
investigative techniques, nor did any of them purport to fill a gap in an
existing statutory scheme.”288 In should be pointed out, however, that
the Mosko court was aware that the Pen/Trap Statute had been passed
but determined that the provision had no retroactive effect such that it
would impact upon the facts of the case at bar. Thus, the court was
aware that the All Writs Act approach did fill a legislative weakness not
repaired until the enactment of ECPA.289
Although the Mosko court did not expressly rule on the propriety of
securing a pre-ECPA pen register authorization with an All Writs Act
order, this does not obliterate the fact that such an All Writs Act order
allowing pen register operations was sustained. It is certainly plausible
to suggest that the Mosko court did not directly address the All Writs Act
issue because: (1) law enforcement use of a pen register simply does not
implicate any privacy interests secured by the Constitution and thus
there was no longer a basis left upon which the defendant could
successfully fashion a suppression argument; and because (2) the
defendant never contended that the All Writs Act was an insufficient
foundation upon which to underpin a pen register order.
The EDNY#2 USMJ saw the chasm but either could or would not
make the leap:
The government thus asks me to read into the All Writs
Act an empowerment of the judiciary to grant the
executive branch authority to use investigative
techniques either explicitly denied it by the legislative
branch, or at a minimum omitted from a far-reaching
286
287
288
289
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and detailed statutory scheme that has received the
legislature’s intensive and repeated consideration. Such
a broad reading of the statute invites an exercise of
judicial activism that is breathtaking in its scope and
fundamentally inconsistent with my understanding of
the extent of my authority.290
The fact of the matter, as actually demonstrated by Mosko, is that
when Congress either fails to act or has not yet acted (as in the case where
investigative practice or technological advancements outpace existing
statutory provisions), or simply has not thought to act, legal
workarounds are fashioned, and many succeed─again, as in Mosko─until
the law catches up. Certainly “sneak and peek” searches were
conducted before 18 U.S.C. § 3103a was enacted as part of the USA
PATRIOT Act.291 From the ELSUR arena, recall that when Title III
intercept targets speak in code or use a language for which law
enforcement does not have a translator immediately available, after-thefact minimization is statutorily permitted.292 Before 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)
was amended to legislatively permit such an operational approach,
however, such after-the-fact minimization had been judicially sanctioned
before Congress could change the law to effect a “catch up” with existing
practice.293 This is the same scenario faced now with respect to cell
phone tracking─no statute specifically addresses the topic, and a workaround, such as with Rule 57(b) and the All Writs Act, should be
fashioned until such time as Congress may act on the matter, especially
since the DOJ’s hybrid theory has been so underwhelming.
E. Voluntarily Conveying Information to Third Parties
In the course of reaching its conclusion that “[t]he installation and
use of a pen register . . . was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required
[to conduct pen register operations,]”294 the Supreme Court in Smith v.
EDNY#2, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see, e.g., United States v.
Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993). “A sneak and peek warrant is one that authorizes
officers to secretly enter (either physically or electronically), conduct a search, observe, take
measurements, conduct examinations, smell, take pictures, copy documents, download or
transmit computer files, and the like; and depart without taking any tangible evidence or
leaving notice of their presence.” Charles Doyle, Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the
USA PATRIOT Act, CONG. RES. SERV. at 9 (Dec. 10, 2001), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/ terrorism/usapatriot/RL31200.pdf.
292
See supra note 73.
293
See, e.g., United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Cale, 508 F. Supp. 1038, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
294
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
290
291
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Maryland295 analogized the circumstances surrounding one who dials
digits from a phone (and thus conveys those numbers to a third party,
i.e., the telephone company) to that of a customer providing personal
financial information to a bank with whom the customer conducts
business.296
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the Government. . . . This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.297
Thus, one who carries a cell phone about─depending upon one’s
perspective─is doubly cursed: not only does the user lack any
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his/her movements out
in public, s/he is also damned with respect to the numbers s/he dials
because those digits are voluntarily conveyed to the service provider.
The user “assumes the risk” that any information s/he surrenders to a
third party will be provided to law enforcement authorities. Despite
arguments from some of the USMJs to the contrary,298 this same
argument holds true with regard to the cell phone location information a
user broadcasts every time the instrument is turned on. Just as no one
Id.
This analogy was based on the facts in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Congress was so unhappy with the Miller decision, which was constitutionally based, that
it passed a law to statutorily protect the financial information customers pass along to their
banking institutions. See the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000).
297
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).
298
Discussing both Smith and its treatment by Forest, the SDTX#1 USMJ said “[u]nlike
dialed telephone numbers, cell site data is not ‘voluntarily conveyed’ by the user to the
phone company. As we have seen, it is transmitted automatically during the registration
process, entirely independent of the user’s input, control, or knowledge.” SDTX#1, 396 F.
Supp. 2d 747, 756-57 (S.D. Tex. 2005). According to the SDTX#1 USMJ, Forest concluded
that Smith was inapplicable to cell phone location information. Id. at 757. Even if Forest
could be read to that effect, this is flawed reasoning. The registration may be “automatic”
but it is the user who sets everything in motion─thus causing the registration─by
voluntarily turning the cell phone on or, if it is on, by consciously electing not to turn it off.
The user thus has “control” over the registration process. A telephone user presses a speed
dial button and the instrument automatically phones a number; a telephone user presses a
power button and the instrument automatically registers.
295
296
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forces a bank customer to do business with a financial institution, no one
forces a target to use a cell phone. It is the user’s conscious decision to
activate and operate the instrument and s/he “assumes the risk” that the
service provider will turn over to law enforcement the location
information that the user broadcasts while carrying about a cell phone in
operation.
F. 18 U.S.C. § 3117
There are only two places in Title 18 where the term “tracking
device” is used: once within Title III at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C),299 and
again within § 3117 itself. Perhaps meaningfully, the term is nowhere to
be found in either the Pen/Trap Statute, CALEA, or the SCA. The
ECPA, the same public law which brought forth both the Pen/Trap
Statute and the SCA, was the same act which also added Section 3117 to
Title 18.300 “Tracking device,” therefore, was certainly a term of which
Congress was well cognizant. If either the Pen/Trap Statute or the SCA
were meant to govern tracking operations, surely Congress knew to say
so, particularly in the same bill, but it did not, which strongly suggests
that neither the Pen/Trap Statute nor the SCA was intended or meant to
govern electronic tracking.
It is certainly a canon of statutory
interpretation that a law whose language is drafted generally will be
trumped by one written more specifically or precisely.301
It is also black letter law that legislative history is not consulted if the
statute to which it relates is clear on its face.302 The problem with this
particular adage, of course, lies in its application (the devil is always in
the details): a law that is clear to one person is cloudy to the next. That
said, if one begins with the words of 18 U.S.C. § 3117, we know that it
299
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C), which references 18 U.S.C. § 3117, provides that the term
“electronic communication” does not include “any communication from a tracking device
(as defined in section 3117 of this title)[.]” In other words, no part of Title III covers
tracking device operations.
300
ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 108, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3117.
Recall that Title III was passed in 1968, the ECPA was enacted in 1986, and CALEA became
law in 1994.
301
Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another
deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two
should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter
will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general
statute, unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the
general act controlling.
2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:05, at 244-46, 248, 25657 (6th ed. 2000).
302
Id. at vol. 2A, § 46:01, pp. 118-19.
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defines “tracking device” as “an electronic or mechanical device which
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”303 A cell
phone easily falls into this category. By its terms, the statute also tells us
that court permission to use a “tracking device” can come by way of “a
warrant or other order.”304 (Unfortunately, the provision fails to instruct
which “other order” would be satisfactory.) What the statute does not
say is telling—there is no requirement that the “other order” be based
upon probable cause. Thus, we might properly conclude that court
authorization need not be in the form of a warrant and resultantly need
not be based upon probable cause. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) does not even
make it clear whether court authorization is required in all instances
before electronic/mechanical tracking device operations can commence;
it merely recites that “[i]f a court is empowered to issue a warrant or
other order for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such order
may authorize the use of that device within the jurisdiction of the court,
and outside that jurisdiction if the device is installed in that
jurisdiction.”305 This begs the question whether a court order to “use” a
tracking device is required if the “device” does not require installation.
If we dare turn to § 3117’s legislative history, the waters get
somewhat muddied. The relevant Senate Report says that “electronic
tracking devices (transponders) . . . are one way radio communication
devices that emit a signal on a specific radio frequency. This signal can
be received by special tracking equipment,306 and allows the user307 to
trace the geographical location of the transponder [with] [s]uch ‘homing’
devices[.]”308 If a “tracking device” is a one-way radio, how can such an
instrument be a cell phone? The section-by-section analysis of the bill
which became ECPA does not shed much additional light on an
understanding of the provision. It reaffirms that a “tracking device” is
“an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of
movement of a person or object.”309 It also restates that § 3117 “provides
that if a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order for the
303
18 U.S.C. § 3117(b). Note, too, that the § 3117 definition of “tracking device” applies
only within that section. Id. In other words, a “tracking device” as defined for § 3117
purposes does not necessarily hold the same meaning elsewhere.
304
Id. § 3117(a) (emphasis added).
305
Id. (emphasis added).
306
Does a cell tower qualify as “special tracking equipment?” One would not think so.
307
In this statutory instance, the “user” is the one with the radio receiver, not the
“transmitter.” A cell phone, of course, transmits and receives. Cell phone owners,
subscribers, customers, etc., are generally considered “users” and not third parties
attempting to determine the users’ whereabouts.
308
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564.
309
Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3588.
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installation of a mobile tracking device” it may do so regardless of what
Federal judicial districts the tracked person or object traverses—”even
outside the jurisdiction of the United States[.]”310 The report adds that
“[t]his [jurisdictional] clarification does not effect [sic] current legal
standards for the issuance of such an order.”311 Recall, then, that ECPA
and § 3117 were enacted in 1986 post-Knotts and post-Karo (which, as
discussed earlier, held that no court authorization was required to
electronically track one’s journeys on public thoroughfares), but before
the 1994 passage of CALEA.
In short, looking only at § 3117 strongly suggests that a cell phone is
or qualifies as a tracking device within the meaning of that section.
Looking at the legislative history, however, leaves one with the
impression that Congress had little clue about what technology was
coming down the pike. As previously discussed, cell phones did not
start being widely marketed in the U.S. until the mid-1980s so this is not
necessarily surprising. Thus, it would appear that at least in this
instance, the statutory language Congress came up with was drafted in
such a manner as to preclude being artificially locked in by the state of
technology as it existed in 1986, i.e., in the face of this chronology the
statute’s legislative history should not be viewed as determinative. It
would appear clear that on the statute’s face, a cell phone easily fits
within the term “tracking device” and that this language is more direct
and particularized than the more generalized language found in the
Pen/Trap Statute and in the SCA, the latter two provisions being laws
which others contend relate also to tracking devices or processes.
G. CALEA Does Not Preclude Application of the All Writs Act and Rule
57(b)
At its heart, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 is a “capability requirements” provision
setting a minimum standard or floor that telecommunications carriers
had to meet in order to, among other things, ensure that law
enforcement would continue to have lawful access to wire and electronic
communications in the face of fast-paced technological innovation and
advancement in telecommunications. It did not preclude the industry
from designing its architecture—for its own purposes—to do more than
the CALEA “floor.” Indeed, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1) specifically precluded
law enforcement from requiring the adoption by industry or prohibiting
the industry’s implementation of any particular technology.312 In other
310
311
312

Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3587-3588.
Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3588.
47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1) (2000) states that,
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words, the government could tell the industry what minimum
capabilities were required but could not tell it how to achieve those
minimums. Thus, when 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) mandates that providers
must have the capability of “expeditiously isolating and enabling the
government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to
access call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the
carrier,”313 it did not require the government to secure a court order in all
instances and it did not, in those instances where a court order might be
necessary or desirable, direct that the order be a warrant, i.e., grounded
upon probable cause. If the government, however, wanted access to callidentifying information for law enforcement purposes314—to the extent it
would not be revealed in a very general sense by the user’s area
code315—it must underpin its application for an order (indeed, if an order
were needed316) with a legal basis either in addition to or other than the
Pen/Trap Statute.
H. Does the SCA Fit in Anywhere?
Because neither the SCA nor the Pen/Trap Statute specifically relates
to “tracking devices,” “work-arounds” using the pair either singly or as a
statutory duo is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.317 As a
number of the USMJs point out, the SCA does not contemplate yet-to-beacquired information: it is not, temporally speaking, a forward-looking
[t]his subchapter [47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010] does not authorize any law
enforcement agency or officer—(A) to require any specific design of
equipment, facilities, services, features, or system configurations to be
adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic communication
service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any
provider of telecommunications support services; or (B) to prohibit the
adoption of any equipment, facility, service, or feature by any provider
of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of
telecommunications
equipment,
or
any
provider
of
telecommunications support services.
313
Id. § 1002(a)(2) (emphasis added).
314
As opposed to concerns relating to emergency fire and medical service. See, e.g., 47
C.F.R. § 20.18 (2006).
315
Now that telephone numbers are “portable,” there is no longer any assurance that the
user’s area code will even remotely reveal the general geographic area where the user
makes or receives calls. For example, someone in Virginia can have and use a Maine area
code. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 52.20-52.33 (2006).
316
An order might be necessary if third party assistance, although needed, was not
voluntarily forthcoming.
317
Congress really needs to step in. “The use of real time cell site information by law
enforcement for tracking purposes is a relatively new law enforcement tool and Congress
has yet to provide specific legislative boundaries on the practice.” SDIND, No. IP 05-43CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/2

Clark: Cell Phones as Tracking Devices

2007]

Cell Phones as Tracking Devices

1475

statute. It relates to wire or electronic communication contents in
storage318 and to “record[s] or other information pertaining to a
subscriber to or customer of [an electronic communication or remote
computing service provider] (not including the contents of the
communications)[.]”319
In order to obtain anything more than
rudimentary information,320 the government must use either a warrant321
or a court order,322 the latter being authorized upon a government
offering of “specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”323
The statutory definitions applicable to the SCA do not reflect a
meaning for “records or other information.” 324 “Record” would suggest
“already existing” data325 which, if one had probable cause, could also be
secured with a Rule 41 search warrant. But to what does “other
information” potentially refer? Its meaning is certainly not self-apparent
and could conceivably mean anything other than communication
contents. The legislative history illustrates the term with non-exclusive
examples, “customer lists and payments,”326 which—one could logically
argue—are not in the same category as cell phone location data.
I.

How Does the Pen/Trap Statute Come into Play?

We know how the Pen/Trap Statute was worded when it was first
enacted327 but do we know why its wording was altered from the
definition as originally signed into law? By using text italics and
strikeouts, we can observe how in 2001 the USA PATRIOT Act amended
the term “pen register” to now be
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b) (2000).
Id. § 2703(c).
320
Id. § 2703(c)(2).
321
Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A).
322
Id. § 2703(c)(1)(B).
323
Id. § 2703(d).
324
Id.
325
As opposed to future-occurring location information.
326
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)
permits the provider of the service to divulge, in the normal course of
business, such information as customer lists and payments to anyone
except a government agency. It should be noted that the information
involved is information about the customer’s use of the service not the
content of the customer’s communications.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 38 (1994), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3592.
327
See supra note 261.
318
319
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a device or process which records or decodes electronic or
other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or
otherwise dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information transmitted on the telephone line to which
such device is attached by an instrument or facility from
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted,
provided, however, that such information shall not include the
contents of any communication, but such term does not
include any device or process used by a provider or
customer of a wire or electronic communication service
for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for
communications services provided by such provider or
any device or process used by a provider or customer of a
wire communication service for cost accounting or other
like purposes in the ordinary course of its business[.]328
According to the Congressional Research Service,329 section 216 was
passed, in part, to,
. . . update[ ] the language of the statute to clarify that
the pen/ register authority applies to modern
communication technologies.
Current statutory
references to the target “line,” for example, are revised
to encompass a “line or other facility.” Such a facility
includes: a cellular telephone number; [and] a specific
cellular telephone identified by its electronic serial
number (ESN) . . . . ”Further, because the pen register or
trap and trace ‘device’ is often incapable of being
physically ‘attached; to the target facility due to the
nature of modern communication technology, [the]
section . . . makes two other related changes. First, in
recognition of the fact that such functions are commonly
performed today by software instead of physical
mechanisms, the section allows the pen register or trap
328
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). This change was effectuated by section 216(c)(2) of the USA
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 290 (2001). Parenthetically note that a trap
and trace “device,” the conceptual opposite of a pen register, is defined at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3127(4) and was amended by section 216(c)(3) of the USA PATRIOT Act, in much a
similar manner.
329
“The Congressional Research Service is the public policy research arm of the United
States Congress. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS works
exclusively and directly for Members of Congress, their Committees and staff on a
confidential,
nonpartisan
basis.”
Congressional
Research
Sevice,
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/whatscrs. html (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
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and trace device to be ‘attached or applied’ to the target
facility. Likewise, the definitions of ‘pen register’ and
‘trap and trace device’ in section 3127 [of Title 18] are
revised to include an intangible ‘process’ (such as a
software routine) which collects the same information as a
physical device.” 330
It is important to recall that prior to the wireless revolution, the pen
register was a mechanical instrument—a “physical device”—which was
never capable of providing the telephone user’s geographic location—
not even roughly or approximately. The Pen/Trap Statute was amended
to keep up with changing technology, to ensure that law enforcement
would have access to the same or similar information—and not
more331—in the burgeoning wireless environment as it had traditionally
when wire communications were possible only in a hardline, copper
wire, tangible instrument environment.
J.

Precision GPS Tracking332

As noted briefly at the beginning,333 GPS tracking permits greater
precision (within meters) than is possible by only knowing which
towers a cell phone is “hitting” (sometimes no better accuracy than
within miles). As also pointed out, this more invasive334 GPS tracking
was judicially sanctioned in 2005 by a New York Federal District Court,
Doyle, supra note 291, at 12-13 (emphasis added).
E.g., location information.
332
Global Positioning System (GPS), [is a] space-based radio-navigation
system, consisting of 24 satellites and ground support. GPS provides
users with accurate information about their position and velocity, as
well as the time, anywhere in the world and in all weather conditions.
GPS is available in two basic forms: the standard positioning service
(SPS) and the precise positioning service (PPS). SPS provides a
horizontal position that is accurate to about 100 m (about 330 ft); PPS is
accurate to about 20 m (about 70 ft). For authorized users—normally
the United States military and its allies—PPS also provides greater
resistance to jamming and immunity to deceptive signals.
Microsoft ® Encarta ® Reference Library 2005.
333
See supra note 1.
334
I.e., relative to the degree of precision possible with most cell phone location/cell site
results. Note that some Nextel phones have GPS capability: “GPS location-based safety
services like Mobile Locator™, allows you to locate a friend or family member’s phone
location at anytime, right from your computer. Enjoy audible and visual turn-by-turn
driving directions to any address, anywhere on Nextel’s Nationwide Network. If you need
to make a 911 emergency call, the GPS feature can also help emergency personnel locate
you.”
See Nextel, http://nextelonline.nextel.com/NASApp/onlinestore/en/Action/
SubmitRegionAction# drawers (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
330
331
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United States v. Moran335 using a very uncomplicated Knotts analysis. In
the absence of a warrant, a GPS device had been affixed to the
defendant’s vehicle; thereafter, at trial he moved to suppress all evidence
derived therefrom. The court made the facile but now familiar
observation that “[l]aw enforcement personnel could have conducted a
visual surveillance of the vehicle as it traveled on the public
highways.”336 As a consequence, the defendant “had no expectation of
privacy in the whereabouts of his vehicle on a public roadway.”337 As a
result, the judge remarked, it should not come as a surprise that “there
was no search or seizure and no Fourth Amendment implications in the
use of the GPS device.”338
If no court order, and certainly not one grounded upon the Fourth
Amendment, is needed to conduct relatively precise GPS tracking, it
would therefore stand to reason that no probable cause order would be
constitutionally required to obtain less accurate cell phone location
information.
K. Change to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41
By order dated April 12, 2006, the Supreme Court amended a
number of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including Rule 41,
which became effective on December 1, 2006.339 These rule changes,
accompanied by excerpted notes from the Judicial Conference of the
United States,340 were transmitted on April 12, 2006 by the Chief Justice
to both the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of
the Senate.
Helpfully, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure annotated the new changes with
explanatory text which summarizes the changes to Rule 41. In sum, in
those instances where a tracking device would implicate a Fourth
Amendment “reasonable expectation” of privacy interest (such as
349 F. Supp. 2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 467.
337
Id.
338
Id.
339
Note that 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he Supreme Court
shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in
the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges
thereof)[.]”
340
See Adminisrative Office of the U.S. Court, Fed. R. Crim. P., Amend. Crim. R., Apr. 12,
2006, available at WL 2006 US Order 21; see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (describing the judicial
conference).
335
336

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/2
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performing a hard-wire installation of a tracking device inside a vehicle
trunk or monitoring the whereabouts of a motor vehicle located inside
the garage of a private residence), an applicant—assuming there is
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause341—may seek a Rule 41
tracking device warrant which permits monitoring for up to forty-five
days after installation.342 An unlimited number of extensions for up to 45
days each are permitted for “good cause” shown. The explanatory text
makes clear that the new changes to Rule 41 are not meant to expand or
contract the meaning of the term “tracking device” as set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3117(b).343 Installation must occur within ten calendar days (and
during the daytime unless “good cause” to the contrary is shown) after
the warrant is signed by the magistrate judge. Although installation of
the “device” is to occur within the federal judicial district where the
magistrate judge sits, the person or object being tracked may be
monitored regardless of district.
Within ten calendar days after the tracking has been completed, the
warrant’s return must be made to the magistrate judge designated in the
warrant. “The officer executing a tracking-device warrant must enter on
it the exact date and time the device was installed and the period during
which it was used.”344 A copy of the warrant, which serves as notice that
the tracking has occurred, is to be provided to “the person who was
tracked or whose property was tracked.”345
Service may be accomplished by delivering a copy to the
person who, or whose property, was tracked; or by
leaving a copy at the person’s residence or usual place of
abode with an individual of suitable age and discretion
who resides at that location and by mailing a copy to the
person’s last known address.346

341
If probable cause is demonstrated, the magistrate judge “must” issue the search
warrant. This is unaltered from the version of Rule 41(d)(1) in effect prior to the change.
Importantly, the explanatory text says that the Rule 41 modification does not “hold that
such [tracking device] warrants may issue only on a showing of probable cause. Instead, it
simply provides that if probable cause is shown, the magistrate judge must issue the
warrant.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 Advisory Comm. Nts. on the 2006 Amendments.
342
Any order would permit installation, needed maintenance/repair, monitoring, and
any needed removal.
343
18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2000): “‘[T]racking device’ means an electronic or mechanical
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”
344
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(A).
345
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2)(C).
346
Id.
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Such notice will, of course, probably compromise the investigation and
thus it may be delayed “if the delay is authorized by statute,”347 which,
in this case, would be a reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3101(a). Section 3103(a),
in turn, permits such a delay if the court finds “reasonable cause” to
believe notice would otherwise occasion an “adverse result” (as defined
at 18 U.S.C. § 2705).348 The explanatory text also says that a delay “might
be appropriate, for example, where the owner of the tracked property is
undetermined . . . .”
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the success rate of DOJ’s hybrid theory in support of cell
site location information applications has been less than impressive, the
only thing that is truly clear is that the state of the law is unclear. As of
this writing,349 only one of the USMJ cell site location opinions
summarized above has been reviewed by a U.S. District Court Judge, nor
does there appear to be any similar case (except Forest350) authored by
higher judicial authority. This is bound to change, however, and readers
should be alert as the law in this area continues to emerge.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(3).
Incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2), an “adverse result” would thus be defined as, (a)
endangering the life or physical safety of an individual; (b) flight from prosecution; (c)
destruction or tampering with evidence; (d) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (e)
otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation.
349
November 6, 2006.
350
United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 856 (2004).
347
348

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/2

